

Japanese Diplomatic Policy and Differences in the Handling of Quinine Supply by the Japanese Government during World War II

Takashi SAKATA*

第二次大戦中日本の外交政策の反映としての仕向け先による キニーネ輸出取り扱いの差異

坂田 隆*

*School of Science and Engineering, Ishinomaki Senshu University, 986-8580 Ishinomaki, Japan

Abstract

This article presents a country/area-sorted chronology concerning quinine transport from Japan during World War II, mainly based on archival material in the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR) of the National Archives of Japan. The chronology indicates that Imperial Japan used quinine captured and produced in Java under Japanese occupation as a diplomatic tool in order to reinforce friendships with occupied countries/area such as Thailand, Philippines and French Indochina. However, response to requests for quinine from axis and neutral countries varied. Japan made a far larger effort for neutral Afghanistan than for axis Bulgaria for the transport of quinine, although Japan offered a cheaper price for the latter. Such a difference should reflect diplomatic policy of Imperial Japan during World War II.

Keywords: quinine, price, transport, Afghanistan

和文要約

第二次大戦中の日本からのキニーネ輸出の様相を仕向け先国・地域別に時系列にまとめた。これにもとづいて考察すると、仕向け先によって扱いが大きく異なり、その差異は当時の日本の外交政策を反映していたことが明らかになった。

1. Introduction

In 1940, more than 90% of the world production of quinine, the single most important anti-malaria drug, was manufactured from cinchona bark produced in the Dutch East Indies, mainly Java. Accordingly, the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies in March 1942 more-or-less brought the entire supply of quinine under the control of Japan. The Japanese government, namely the Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), realized that quinine could be used as a diplomatic tool.

The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR) has records of telegrams and other communications concerning the diplomatic use of quinine by the Japanese Army and the MFA.

Materials from different archives were identified, chronologically ordered, made more legible for modern readers, and necessary information like footnotes added.¹ The present article presents that chronology after English translation and sorting by country/area, as well as a discussion of the diplomatic interactions between Japan and foreign countries/area that asked Japan for quinine. This provides us critical material for understanding the attitude of the Imperial Japanese government towards foreign counterparts.

Japanese names in the present article are written in Japanese order, family name first. The source archive in JACAR is noted as (JACAR Ref. reference ID). This article is based on re-

*石巻専修大学理工学部食環境学科

¹ This English article based on a Japanese language article published earlier. Sakata T, (2020) "Dainiji taisen chu nihon no kinine no gaikou riyou ni kansuru kiroku (Records on the Diplomatic Use of Quinine by Japanese Government during World War II)", *Bulletin of Ishinomaki Senshu University* No.31, 125-147.

search conducted with the financial support of KAKENHI (Kiban (B) 19H01227).

2. Wartime supply capacity of quinine

The Vice Minister of the Imperial Army of Japan cabled the Southern Army Chief of Staff (cc to the 16th Army Chief of Staff)² on 11 June 1942, three months after the Japanese invasion of Java, inquiring if it was possible to produce 200 tons of quinine sulfate for export on top of 100 tons of quinine sulfate and 1,000 tons of cinchona bark for domestic use.³

The 16th Army Chief of Staff replied to the Vice Minister of Army within 10 days⁴ that it is possible to supply 1,000 tons of cinchona bark and to produce 300 tons of quinine sulfate at the Bandung Quinine Factory. Bandung Quinine Factory was the main factory producing quinine from cinchona bark in the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese Army had some knowledge of the productive capacity of this factory already from the pre-war period, because the Japanese Army had imported quinine sulfate from the Bandung Quinine Factory via a pharmaceutical company, Shionogi.⁵ The Japanese Army first planned to let a Japanese pharmaceutical company, Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited, operate this factory under the control of the Army until shortly before the invasion⁶ and planned to send an army pharmacist major and a pharmaceutical engineer to control this operation.⁷ However, on 17 September 1942, the Japanese Army decided to operate the Bandung Quinine Factory by

itself.⁸ The Japanese Army temporarily named the factory “Rikugun Kinine Seizousho (Army Quinine Factory)” and placed under the control of the commander of the 16th Army. The main staff presumably was constituted of captured Dutch and local people, as well as from Takeda. The factory was expected to produce 300 tons and 600 tons in fiscal years 1942 and 1943, respectively. That factory became under the direct control of the Military Administration of 16th Army from 25 September, 1942.⁹

3. Nation/Area-wise Chronology

3.1. Countries under Japanese Control

3.1.1. Thailand

7 May, 1942 Donation of 3 tons of quinine

Vice Minister of Army of Japan¹⁰ decided to provide 3 tons of quinine sulfate as a gift to Thailand and ordered the Chief of Staff of the Southern Army,¹¹ the 16th Army Chief of Staff¹², and the military attaché in Thailand to immediately send 3 tons of quinine sulfate captured by the 16th Army to the military attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Thailand.¹³ This was just 2 months after the Japanese occupation of Java. This donation was the result of the visit of Lieutenant General Phraya Phahon¹⁴ as a delegate to celebrate Japan–Thailand alliance.¹⁵ Phraya Phahon explained to the Army General Staff Office that soldiers of the Thai Army at the Thai–Burmese

² The Sixteenth Army occupied Java from March 1942.

³ Telegram from Vice–Minister of Army to Southern Army Chief of Staff (*Nanpo-gun Sosanbocho*), cc to the 16th Army Chief of Staff (*Osame-shudan Sanbocho*) No.574 832 on 11 June 1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000424300)

⁴ Telegram from 16th Army Chief of Staff to Vice–Minister of Army No.75 on 21 June 1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000424300)

⁵ Import Certificate by Army issued on 20 June 1941. (JACAR Ref. C14010097500)

⁶ Telegram from Vice Minister of the Army to Southern Army Chief of Staff No.123 184 on 27 February 1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000121500)

⁷ Telegram from staff officer of the Commissary General to Southern Army Chief of Staff No.85 633 on 12 March, 1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000121500)

⁸ Telegram from Vice–Minister of Army to Southern Army Chief of Staff and 16th Army Chief of Staff No.3536 on 17 September, 1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000721800)

⁹ Telegram from Head of Military Administration of the 16th Army to Vice–Minister of Army No.353 on 17 September, 1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000733600)

¹⁰ Kimura Heitaro (木村兵太郎, 1888–1948), lieutenant general.

¹¹ Tsukada Osamu (塚田攻, 1886–1942), lieutenant general.

¹² Okazaki Seizaburo (岡崎清三郎, 1893–1979), major general.

¹³ Telegram from Vice Minister of Army to Southern Army Chief of Staff, 16th Army Chief of Staff, and military attaché in Thailand No.438 690 on 7 May, 1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000660400)

¹⁴ Phraya Phahonphonphayahasena (1887–1947) was a Thai military leader and politician. He became the second prime minister of Siam in 1933 after ousting his predecessor in a coup d'état. He retired in 1938 after serving five years as prime minister. (Wikipedia, “Phraya Phahonphonphayahasena”, accessed on 8 October 2020)

¹⁵ *Asahi Shinbun* newspaper, Osaka edition, 17 April 1942.

border were suffering from malaria and lacked quinine. The note attached to this telegram¹⁶ stated that the domestic price of quinine sulfate was JPY 80,000 per ton, while the annual requirement in Japan at peace time was 30 tons, and that in Thailand was 9 tons.

9 May, 1942 Southern Army is ready to supply 3 tons

The Southern Army Chief of Staff replied to the Vice Minister that the Southern Army was ready to send 3 tons of quinine sulfate to Thailand as the gift.¹⁷ The Chief of Staff also stated that the Southern Army had already received a request from Thailand and answered that Southern Army was ready to sell quinine after notification of the amount necessary. The Southern Army expected a request of less than 1 ton at this time. The Southern Army was already in the process of transporting 1 ton from Java. The transport for the additional 2 tons would be arranged as soon as possible.

23 September, 1942 Arrangement for fair sharing of quinine between the Thai Army and Navy.

After the delivery of quinine sulfate to Thailand, the Vice Minister of the Army asked the military attaché in Thailand to encourage the Thai Army to share the quinine sulfate with the Thai Navy, because the Thai Navy had asked the Japanese Navy to help to obtain a fair share of the donated quinine sulfate, which was entirely kept by the Army.¹⁸

3.1.2. Philippines

13 December, 1943 Letter of thanks from Claro Recto for the donation of quinine and other goods

Aoki Kazuo,¹⁹ Minister of Greater East Asia,²⁰ transmitted this letter of thanks for the gift of rice, quinine and cotton cloth to celebrate the independence of Philippines²¹ to Prime Minister Tojo Hideki²²:

<Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs²³ of the Philippines to Japanese Ambassador²⁴>

Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Manila, December 13, 1943

Excellency:

By direction of His Excellency the President of the Republic of the Philippines, I have the honor to transmit information concerning the plan of distributing the rice, quinine and cotton cloth donated by His Excellency the Premier of Japan to the Republic of the Philippines on the occasion of its inauguration, and to convey through Your Excellency the renewed expression of appreciation and gratitude of His Excellency the President and of the Philippine Government to the Imperial Japanese Government for its never failing magnanimity and sincere desire to help the Republic of the Philippines.

With reference to the rice, a small quantity of the 6,000 cavan²⁵ already received out of the 25,000 cavan²⁵ donated has been distributed among the sufferers of the recent flood in Manila and neighboring towns. The remainder of the 6,000 cavan²⁵ is being held for distribution as the

¹⁶ Attachment to telegram No.438 690 on 7 May 1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000660400)

¹⁷ Telegram from the Southern Army Chief of Staff to Vice Minister of Army No.688 on 9 May 1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000660400)

¹⁸ Telegram from Vice Minister of the Army to the military attaché in Thailand No.1134 on 23 September,1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000424300)

¹⁹ Aoki Kazuo (青木一男, 1889–1982) was Minister of Greater East Asia from November 1942 to July 1944.

²⁰ The Ministry of Greater East Asia was responsible for governing mandate and occupied territories of Japan. The ministers after Aoki doubled as Minister of Foreign Affairs due to the loss of these territories.

²¹ The Philippines became “independent” under the Japanese Military Government on 14 October 1944. José Paciano Laurel y García became President. (JACAR Ref. B02032954100)

²² Tojo Hideki (東条英機, 1884–1948) was Prime Minister from October 1941 to July 1944.

²³ Claro Mayo Recto (1890–1960) was Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Philippines between 1943 and 1945.

²⁴ Murata Shozo (村田省蔵, 1878–1957) was the first Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Philippines.

²⁵ Sometimes spelled cavan, caban or kaban. (Leo James. *Tagalog-English Dictionary*. 1986 (23rd printing, November 2008). page 261.) Cavan(e) was defined in the 19th century by the government of the Spanish East Indies as being equivalent to 75 litres. (Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department. *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*. 1903. Washington (DC): U.S.G.P.O. 1904.)

need for it arises. The general policy adopted by this Government regarding the distribution of this rice is to use it for the relief of the needy as much as possible.

As regards the three tons of quinine, it is the plan to distribute them among the provinces in accordance with their needs through government hospitals, dispensaries and other, government-controlled institutions to make sure that the quinine reaches the people suffering from malaria and that it is administered according to the prescription of competent physicians. A similar manner of distribution was adopted to the case of the one ton of quinine donated also by His Excellency the Premier of Japan on a previous occasion.

As to the cotton cloth, it will be distributed, when received, among the hospitals, asylas, orphanages and other institutions operated by this Government for the benefit of the needy elements of the population. Such of the cotton cloth as may be best suited to the needs of farm and factory workers will be distributed among these classes of people upon payment by them of the price to be fixed by the Government.

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Sgd.) CLARO RECTO

Copy/ag.

3.2. Axis country/area

3.2.1. French Indochina

Quinine factory in French Indochina

Decoux²⁶ adopted a strategy in which the local

Indochina government supported medical and chemical industries such as quinine production. However, as French Indochina was economically separated from France from the end of 1941, these measures could only help to avoid complete subordination to Japanese economy in a situation where they were forced to participate in the economic zone of Japan.²⁷

16 June, 1942 Decision to supply quinine to French Indochina

The Vice Minister of the Army informed the Southern Army Chief of Staff that the Vice Minister agreed to provide 3 tons of quinine to French Indochina as a gift.²⁸

4 October, 1943 Confirmation of the amount of quinine for French Indochina

Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs,²⁹ informed the Japanese Ambassador to France, Mitani Takanobu,³⁰ about the plan to supply 6 tons of quinine, while French Indochina demanded an additional 3 tons based on the agreement for 9 tons in Vichy.³¹ Shigemitsu considered this should be a misunderstanding and instructed Mitani to investigate this.³²

Local memory of quinine gift

This gift of quinine was recognized by local people. The Vietnamese historian Trần Huy Liệu stated “Japanese fascists built a few Japanese hospitals in Hanoi and Saigon and donated several tons of quinine.”³³

3.2.2. Bulgaria

31 March, 1943 Request from Bulgaria

²⁶ Jean Decoux (1884–1963) was a French Admiral. From July 1940 to 9 March 1945 and served as Governor-General of French Indochina as a representative of the Vichy French government. (Wikipedia “Jean Decoux”, accessed on 8 October 2020)

²⁷ Akagi Kanji (赤木完爾) (1984) “Futsuin buryoku shori wo meguru gaikou to gunji: ‘jizon-jiei’ to ‘daitoa kaihou’ no aida (Japanese wartime policy toward French Indochina reexamined: designs and realities) *Hougaku Kenkyu* (法学研究) 57, 28–62.

²⁸ Telegram from Vice Minister of Army to Southern Army Chief of Staff No.597 26 on 16 June 1942. (JACAR Ref. C01000383700)

²⁹ Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光葵, 1887–1957) was Minister of Foreign Affairs between 20 April 1943 and 7 April 1945.

³⁰ Mitani Takanobu (三谷隆信, 1892–1985) was Ambassador Plenipotentiary to France from 1942 to 1946.

³¹ Capital of the French State from 1 July 1940. During this period, the Japanese Embassy was in Vichy.

³² Telegram from Shigemitsu to Mitani No.259 on 4 October, 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200) There should be another telegram from Mitani to Shigemitsu, which was not found in JACAR.

³³ Trần Huy Liệu et al. (1957) “Furansu-nihon shihaika no betonamu shakai (Vietnamese society under the French-Japanese ruling) in *Afro-Asian Institute of Japan* (1970) “Shiryo betonamu kaihou (Materials History of Vietnam Liberation) volume 1, Roudoujunnousha cited from Miyahara Akira (2004) “Nichihitsu kyoudou shihaiki no betonamu deno nihongo kyōiku: betonamu nihongo kyōikushi no tameno noto: (Japanese education in Vietnam during Japan–France synarchy period: note for the history of Japanese language education in Vietnam)” *Journal of International Student Center Nagasaki University* 12, 41–57.

Tani, Minister of Foreign Affairs³⁴ answered the Japanese Envoy in Bulgaria,³⁵ who was very likely asked to provide quinine to Bulgaria beforehand.³⁶ Tani, who was also asked by Bulgarian Envoy in Tokyo³⁷ for quinine supply, accepted the proposal and decided to supply at most 5 tons (price JPY 500,000) as a supply to the Bulgarian military, without making this matter an issue of commerce.

The Director of Commerce of MFA transmitted this to the Bulgarian Envoy and informed him that Japan cannot make arrangements for the transportation. The Bulgarian envoy acknowledged the conditions with gratitude and answered that the transportation will be discussed with Germany in Berlin. The Bulgarian Envoy expressed his gratitude and he is reporting the details to his country immediately.

As the Bulgarian Envoy asked about the payment, the Director of Commerce answered that Japan wishes the payment to be made in Swiss Francs, although the method of payment would not be a serious problem once the problem of transportation is solved. The Minister of Foreign Affairs ordered this telegram be conveyed to the Japanese Ambassador to Germany.³⁸

9 October, 1943 Approval of supply to Bulgaria

Shigemitsu, Foreign Minister of Japan, informed Yamaji, the Japanese Envoy in Bulgaria, that “in spite of our insufficient stock of quinine we are going to supply 5 tons of quinine in exchange for tires. This should be independent from copper wire. Please negotiate with the Bulgarian side and notify us by cable. It is of course the Bulgarian responsibility to negotiate with Germans about the transport. We are going

to supply it separately in about 5 lots due to the present supply situation. The delivery will be to some port in East Asia, at approximately JPY 150,000 F.O.B. The precise price will be informed by cable later.”³⁹

28 October 1943 Urgent request to supply quinine

Yamaji reported to Shigemitsu⁴⁰ that Bulgaria wished to obtain quinine to be transported by Minkoff, an official interpreter of Bulgarian Legation to Japan⁴¹ who was returning home, and that Bulgaria already instructed the Bulgarian Envoy in Tokyo. The Bulgarian Department of Hygiene unofficially requested Yamaji to help with the purchase, transport and export. Yamaji asked Shigemitsu to accept the request if and when the Bulgarian Envoy requested. Yamaji made it clear that this request is independent from the request on 31 March 1943.

9 November 1943 Refusal of urgent supply of quinine

Shigemitsu refused the urgent request for supply of quinine, because (1) the above telegram was finally delivered in the evening of 8 November due to difficulty in decoding, when Minkoff was leaving Tokyo, therefore it is impossible to let Minkoff carry quinine with him, and (2) it is not possible to supply more than 5 tons, because we have little surplus and the military is opposing the export of quinine.⁴² Shigemitsu instructed Yamaji to report the results of the negotiation concerning the telegram on 9 October. Shigemitsu also informed Yamaji about the uncoded telegram from Khursanov⁴³ to Mitsui⁴⁴ to hand over 50 kg quinine to Bulgarian Legation in

³⁴ Tani Masayuki (谷正之, 1889–1962).

³⁵ Yamaji Akira (山路章). (Home page of the Japanese Embassy in Bulgaria)

³⁶ Telegram from Foreign Minister to Japanese Envoy in Bulgaria No.42 on 31 March 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315100)

³⁷ Yanko Peev (ЯнкоПеев, 1882–1947) was the Bulgarian Envoy Extraordinary to Japan from August 1942 to January 1943. (JACAR Ref. B15100395800)

³⁸ Oshima Hiroshi (大島浩, 1886–1975).

³⁹ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Yamaji No.259 on 9 October 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200). The telegram from Yamaji to Shigemitsu quoted here was not found.

⁴⁰ Telegram from Yamaji to Shigemitsu No.334 sent on 28 October 1943 and arrived on 30 October. However, the telegram was unclear and it was 8 November when the telegram was finally delivered to Shigemitsu as the later telegram from Shigemitsu stated. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁴¹ Svetoslav Konstantinov Minkoff (Светослав Константинов Минков, 1902–1966) was an official interpreter at the Bulgarian Legation in Japan from August 1942 to November 1943. Minkoff left Tokyo on 9 November, traveled via Shimonoseki, Pusan, Ändong and Mänzhöulü, and entered the USSR on 22 November with a Hungarian secretary. (JACAR Refs. B15100395700 and B15100395900) Note that Bulgaria was on the axis side but did not declare war with the USSR until September 1944.

⁴² Telegram from Shigemitsu to Yamaji No.106 on 9 November, 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

Tokyo and instructed Yamaji to warn Bulgaria to withhold such direct communication between traders.

13 November 1943 *Anxiety about the transport*

Yamaji sent a staff member carrying the suggestion of Shigemitsu in writing to Karenchev, the Director of Trade. The Director immediately expressed his agreement.⁴⁵ While Yamaji asked for a written answer, the Director expressed agreement but looked anxious about the realization of the transport by Germans. Yamaji was expecting to get the written answer within days. As for the warning about the uncoded telegram from Khursanov to Mitsui, Yamaji summoned Khursanov and warned him. Since Mitsui also sent an uncoded telegram, Yamaji asked Shigemitsu to warn Mitsui too.

I was not able to find a record showing the realization of provision of quinine to Bulgaria.

3.3 Neutral countries

3.3.1. Afghanistan

Background Situation

Afghanistan stayed neutral throughout World War II and was a diplomatic front between the Axis and Allied countries in 1943, but leaning towards the Allies. The US Envoy in Afghanistan⁴⁶ described the situation in one telegram saying “the economic outlook in Afghanistan was ex-

tremely gloomy.”⁴⁷ Both axis and allied countries tried to attract the Afghans by presenting gifts. While the Germans had been lavish with cash and presents and thus secured a large following among the Afghans, especially among the minor officials and young intelligentsia.⁴⁸ The US Envoy in Afghanistan officially presented a Dodge army station wagon to the King and a Stearman trainer plane⁴⁹ to the Afghan Air Force.⁵⁰ The situation in the European front seemed to have moved the Afghan government in the favor of UK and USA partly due to fear of the neighboring USSR. This was shown by the instruction of Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs that “the foreign exchange and other financial transactions of the Axis representatives be closely scrutinized and controlled and that the four Japanese engineers employed in Afghanistan be sent away.”⁵¹ The US Secretary of State informed Engert, the US Envoy, that the US was keen to send civil engineers requested by the Afghan government with potential financial support.⁵²

This was based on reports that Japan had sent irrigation engineers⁵³ in the service of Afghan Ministry of Public Works in the Kandahar Province.⁵⁴ The US Envoy in Afghanistan suggested to the Secretary of State replacing these engineers with “first-class (US) irrigation engineers.”

27 July 1943 *First Afghan Request*

Shichida, the Japanese Envoy Extraordinary to

⁴³ Not identified yet.

⁴⁴ Mitsui & Co., Ltd.

⁴⁵ Telegram from Yamaji to Shigemitsu No.349 sent on 13 November 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁴⁶ Cornelius Van Hemert Engert (1887–1985) was the third US Envoy to Afghanistan, serving between 2 July 1942–17 August 1945.

⁴⁷ The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State, 27 January 1943. *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943. The Near East and Africa*, Volume IV. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. (890H.50/8: Telegram)

⁴⁸ The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State, 20 July 1943. (*ibid.*) (890H.00/241: Telegram)

⁴⁹ The Stearman (Boeing) Model 75 was a biplane military trainer. (P. M. Bowers, Gordon S. Swanborough (1990) *United States Navy Aircraft since 1911*, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, pp.494–495.

⁵⁰ The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State, 27 May 1943. *Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1943. The Near East and Africa*, Volume IV. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. (890H.24/86: Telegram)

⁵¹ The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State, 3 June 1943. (*ibid.*) (862.20290H/8: Telegram)

⁵² The Secretary of State to the Minister in Afghanistan (Engert), 29 April 1943 (*ibid.*) (811.42790H/54a: Telegram)

⁵³ A hand-written report from Japanese Chargés d’Affaires ad Interim Iwasaki Shintaro (岩崎信太郎) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka Yosuke (松岡洋右) on 1 February 1941 mentioned an engineer, Tada Hiroshi (多田弘), invited by the Afghan government to improve canals. (JACAR Ref. B04121082800)

⁵⁴ The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State on 17 March 1943. *Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1943. The Near East and Africa*, Volume IV. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. (811.42790H/64: Telegram)

Afghanistan,⁵⁵ sent a telegram⁵⁶ to the Minister of Foreign Affairs⁵⁷ transmitting the private opinion of the Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry based on his discussion with the King⁵⁸ and the Prime Minister.⁵⁹ The Political Director inquired if it was possible to purchase 500 to 1,000 kg of quinine sulphate (1,000 kg if the price was within plus 25% of the previous order). The Afghan side was going to obtain the permission of USSR government for transport via Siberia.

28 July 1943 *Recommendation from Shichida*

Shichida sent another telegram on the next day and strongly recommended accepting the Afghan request to purchase quinine.⁶⁰ One reason was to counteract the gift tactics of the US. Another reason was to get cash for the operation of the Japanese Legation in Afghanistan.⁶¹ This, in turn, suggests the difficult diplomatic situation in Afghanistan and the difficulty of supplying cash for isolated legations.

It is interesting that Afghanistan asked Japan for the supply of quinine and planned to transport the quinine via the USSR. Four Japanese engineers left Kabul for Japan via the Soviet Union on 24 September 1943 and crossed the Afghanistan-USSR border to Termez on 29 September 1943.

8 & 23 August 1943 *Acceptance of the Request and Trade Condition*

Shigemitsu answered the telegrams from Shichida on 8 August 1943. Shigemitsu stated that Japan had not supplied quinine to any “neutral” countries so far due to various reasons, however there would be no hinderance to supply quinine to Afghanistan.⁶² That telegram also

proposed conditions for this trade: (a) two lots of 500 kg each will be handed over in Japan, (b) the price will be approximately JPY 100,000 per 500 kg⁶³ and be paid in Swiss Francs, and (c) it is necessary to have the guarantee of Afghan side to secure not to transfer the quinine to the enemy.

Shigemitsu further notified Shichida in more detail about the handling of this matter in two consecutive cables; (a) the guarantee should be given in the form of an official letter from the Afghanistan government to the Japanese Envoy Extraordinary to Afghanistan, (b) the payment in Afghanistan in Afghani will be fine,⁶⁴ and (c) the paid Afghan currency will be used for salaries in the future.⁶⁵

25 August 1943 *Response and the further request of Afghan government*

Shichida reported to Shigemitsu about the response and further request of the Afghan Political Director of the Foreign Ministry on 24 August.⁶⁶ The Political Director informed Shichida that they already proposed to the Soviet Embassy in Kabul that the quinine be transported via the USSR and instructed the Afghan diplomatic establishments in USSR and Tokyo to contact their USSR counterparts on this matter.

The Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Kabul suggested the possibility of the quinine transport. The spread of various diseases is very serious in Afghanistan and the need for all kinds of drugs is urgent. Therefore, Afghanistan sincerely wishes Japan to assist in obtaining quick permission of the USSR for quinine transport either in Tokyo or Moscow. The Political Director also asked for the supply of a further 500 kg of quinine (in two 250 kg lots) under the same conditions. Due to

⁵⁵ Shichida Motokuro (七田基玄) was Japanese Envoy Extraordinary to Afghanistan from 1942 to 1945.

⁵⁶ Telegram from Shichida to Minister of Foreign Affairs No.315 on 27 July, 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315100)

⁵⁷ Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光葵 1887–1957) was Minister of Foreign Affairs between 20 April 1943 and 7 April 1945.

⁵⁸ Mohammed Zahir Shah (1914–2007), reigned from 8 November 1933 to 17 July 1973. (Harris M. Lentz, III, *Heads of States and Governments Since 1945*, Routledge, 2014, p.14).

⁵⁹ Mohammad Hashim Khan (1884–1953) served from 1 November 1929 to 9 May 1946. (*ibid.*, p.14)

⁶⁰ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.316 on 28 July 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315100)

⁶¹ The annual budget of the Japanese legation in Afghanistan in 1943 was CHF 484,446 (CHF 224,000 for salary and CHF 260,446 for operation). (JACAR Ref. A17110618700)

⁶² Telegram from Shigemitsu, to Shichida No.69 on 8 August, 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315100)

⁶³ This price was 2.5 times that of the domestic price in 1942.

⁶⁴ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.76 on 23 August, 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁶⁵ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.77 on 23 August, 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁶⁶ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.350 on 25 August, 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

insufficient communications between the Ministries of Army and Hygiene, the Army Minister explicitly ordered the handing over of a full 500 kg, which put the Ministry of Hygiene in a very difficult situation. Shichida responded to the Political Director that Shichida considers the first supply of 500 kg was already a most affirmative arrangement and he was not sure if there is any margin to accept the additional request, although he would transmit the request to the Japanese MFA.

27 August 1943 Japanese policy on transport and additional supply

Shigemitsu swiftly answered the questions of Shichida on 25 August: (a) transport via the USSR should be handled by the Afghanistan side, because we are not in a position to ask the USSR and we should avoid conveying the impression to the USSR that we are trying to win the favor of Afghanistan, and (b) since our offer was the maximum favorable arrangement, it is difficult to increase the amount at the moment.⁶⁷

5 September 1943 Quinine to be supplied in 2 lots

Shigemitsu informed Shichida that Japan was going to supply the quinine in 2 lots, because this was the condition on which Japan made special consideration for Afghanistan⁶⁸ as stated in the telegram on 8 August.

25 October 1943 USSR agreed for quinine transport

A telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu⁶⁹ reported that the Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry informed Shichida on the phone that the Political Director received the agreement of the USSR for the passage of quinine.

Shichida requested that they instruct the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo to ask the Japanese MFA to receive the quinine immediately. Shichida also confirmed that Afghanistan is responsible for the transport of the quinine after its receipt in Japan. The Political Director then asked for facilitation of the export. Shichida responded that he would convey this to Tokyo.

27 October 1943 Afghan request for 500 kg quinine

Shichida delivered the request of the Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry to Shigemitsu to supply a total of 500 kg at a time, because the director had obtained the permission of USSR for 500 kg and the spread of malaria this year was serious.⁷⁰ Shichida also wished to supply 500 kg to maintain a good relationship with the Prime Minister and Minister of the Army, and to obtain money for the legation. Shichida quoted the report of a contract medical officer, Dr. Watanabe,⁷¹ who had returned from a trip at the beginning of the month, saying that malaria had spread all over the country and that the situation was terribly serious due to the lack of quinine so that it was entirely impossible for Afghanistan to divert quinine to foreign countries even if we supplied 2,000 or 3,000 kg.

27 October 1943 Payment for quinine

Shichida informed the Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry at their regular meeting on 26 October that (1) Afghanistan must submit the guarantee (ref. telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida on 23 August 1943) at the time of the delivery, (2) payment should be made at the time of delivery, and (3) the payment of JPY 100,000⁷² should be Afghani 307,240.⁷³ Political Director agreed to these con-

⁶⁷ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.78 on 27 August, 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁶⁸ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.82 on 15 September, 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200) There seems to be a telegram from Shichida numbered 373-2 after 25 August 1943 which was not found in the JACAR archive.

⁶⁹ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.430 on 25 October 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁷⁰ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.435 on 27 October 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁷¹ Watanabe Hiroshi (渡邊 弘) was a contract medical officer at the Japanese Legation in Kabul who welcomed Shichida when he arrived in Afghanistan after crossing to Amdaryo from Termiz on 15 October 1942. (Anonym, in "Kikuo Kobayashi, Road to Afghanistan in Wartime"; <http://www.saturn.dti.ne.jp/ohori/sub-kobayashi.html>) Watanabe was conducting a survey on malaria and the malaria mosquito in Afghanistan. (JACAR Ref. B04012690900) He also arranged to bring notes and records of Japanese music as a gift for the Afghan Military Band. (JACAR Ref. B04012345900)

⁷² Roughly equivalent to current JPY 63,300,000 - 85,900,000.

⁷³ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.434 dispatched on 27 and arrived on 29 October, 1943. The delay was due to poor transmission. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200) This telegram might have been planned to be sent before No.435.

ditions. Shichida stressed that it was important to include the last condition in the contract even if the other conditions were not able to be included, because Afghan National Bank recently deleted the exchange rate other than with the US, Switzerland or India and reduced the rate arbitrarily.

1 November 1943 Afghan guarantee of domestic consumption

Shichida reported to Shigemitsu that he received an official letter from the Afghan Foreign Minister on 28 October guaranteeing that the quinine will be consumed in Afghanistan alone and will not be exported.⁷⁴ Shichida sent back a receipt letter to Afghan Foreign Minister.

2 November 1943 Inquiry about the annual demand for quinine in Afghanistan

On 27 October 1943, Shigemitsu instructed Shichida to provide the annual demand of quinine in Afghanistan in recent years, while the MFA was negotiating with other ministries to fulfil the request for further quinine.⁷⁵

25 November 1943 Further inquiry about annual demand of quinine and delivery in Tokyo

Shigemitsu again instructed Shichida to provide the annual requirement for quinine in Afghanistan, even if it were a rough estimate, and informed him that 500 kg of quinine would be delivered to the Afghan Legation in Tokyo as soon as Shichida received payment.⁷⁶

26 November, 1943 Arrangement for delivery of the quinine

Shigemitsu informed Shichida the arrangements with Afghan Legation in Tokyo to deliver

500 kg of quinine as soon as the receipt of the payment in Kabul had been finalized, and instructed him to transmit this arrangement to the Afghanistan government, and to cable as soon as Shichida received payment.⁷⁷

2 December 1943 Afghan request to transport quinine to the USSR-Mānzhōulǐ border

Shigemitsu sent a telegram to Shichida on the following subject.⁷⁸ The Afghan Legation in Tokyo desired the quinine to be transported to the Manchukuo-USSR border by Japan. The Japanese MFA had no objection to this desire and was planning to let a transportation company make a contract with the Afghan Legation. However, the Japanese MFA considered the organization to which the quinine was to be handed over was important because it concerned the guarantee of Afghan government not to divert to any third party. Therefore, it was necessary to cable back immediately after the meeting with the Afghan side about this transport issue.

7 December 1943 Iransovtrans or Vostokintorg to receive the quinine at Mānzhōulǐ

Shichida reported the results of a meeting with the Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry on 6 December to Shigemitsu.⁷⁹ The Political Director stated that the Afghan National Bank signed a contract with Afsovtorg⁸⁰ for transport of the quinine. Afsovtorg bears the responsibility for transport inside of the USSR as soon as the payment of USD 2,000 was made. The institution to receive the quinine at the Manchukuo-USSR border should be Iransovtrans⁸¹ or Vostokintorg⁸² within the Molotov Railway.⁸³ The USSR side stated that one of them should have a branch in Mānzhōulǐ.

⁷⁴ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.438 on 1 November 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁷⁵ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.99 on 2 November 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁷⁶ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.105 on 25 November 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁷⁷ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.107 on 26 November 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁷⁸ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.108 on 2 December 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁷⁹ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.477 on 7 December 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁸⁰ Not identified. Potentially, an institution to organize or handle the trade between Afghanistan and the USSR.

⁸¹ Ирансовтранс. A state-owned trading agency of the USSR that imported military supplies from the UK and the USA to the USSR via Iran. (Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, "Военно-техническое сотрудничество в 1941-1945 года" p.23, [http://www.fsvts.gov.ru/materials_rus.nsf/\(htmlPDA\)/3F2F50330EDCDC0C44257B1E0024264D?OpenDocument](http://www.fsvts.gov.ru/materials_rus.nsf/(htmlPDA)/3F2F50330EDCDC0C44257B1E0024264D?OpenDocument))

⁸² Востокинторг (Всесоюзное импортно экспортное объединение по торговле со странами Востока) or All-Union Export-Import Association, carried out operations for the export of goods from the USSR to the countries of the Middle East and other countries, and for the import of goods into the USSR from countries of the Middle East and other countries. ("ТАМОЖЕНН ОЕ ДЕЛЮ В СССР", <http://tst-control.narod.ru/tdelo2.htm>)

7 December 1943 Payment will be made on 16 December

The Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry told Shichida that the payment will be transferred from the Ministry of Hygiene to the National Bank account of the Japanese Legation on 16 December and that the Afghan Legation in Tokyo was instructed to receive the quinine on that day.⁸⁴

14 December 1943 Estimated annual demand for quinine in Afghanistan

Shichida reported to Shigemitsu about the annual demand for quinine in Afghanistan.⁸⁵ Shichida made a direct inquiry to Afghan side but there was no statistical data on the number of patients or the amount of quinine consumption in the Ministry of Hygiene. After further urging, the Afghan side answered that the consumption of governmental institutes, *i.e.* state-operated pharmacies and hospitals plus armed forces, is 1,000 kg; this is thus excluding the consumption of private pharmacies. However, the estimation of Dr. Watanabe of Japanese Legation after discussion with the Supreme Royal Medical Advisor, a Turk who had influence on Afghan hygiene policy, and the director of the Bacterial Research Institute estimated that the quinine consumption of the last year should have been 2,500 to 3,000 kg, assuming per capita consumption of 25 g. In addition, there should be a considerable number of patients untreated in the bandit zone.

21 December 1943 Difficulty with the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo

Shigemitsu instructed Shichida⁸⁶ as follows: (1) There would be no problem to hand over quinine in Tokyo and to let Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited, our designated trading company, make a contract with the Afghan Envoy and transport quinine to Mānzhōulī. (2) The payment for this transport should be paid separately in Kabul in Afghan

currency. (3) Takeda was instructed to contact the Afghan Envoy after arranging permission of the military for the transport of quinine inside of Japan. Thus, Takeda tried to establish contact with the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo. However, the Afghan Envoy declared that the contract in Tokyo with Takeda was not necessary, because Japanese side in Kabul promised handing over in Mānzhōulī. Besides, the Envoy had not received any instruction about the contract from Kabul. The Envoy thus did not sign the contract. The situation was deadlocked.

Shigemitsu further instructed the following: it is essential to make a contract between our designated trading company and the government of Afghanistan or designated trading company representing the government of Afghanistan. Considering Shichida's information about the annual demand of quinine in Afghanistan, 500 kg is a considerably large amount and thereby accompanies the risk to be diverted to enemy side. Accordingly, here is a possibility to entirely re-consider the supply of quinine. Thus, please call the attention of Afghanistan government that the supply of quinine can be cancelled if the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo continues to delay the process.

22 December, 1943 Payment made

Shichida finally received the payment in cash and asked Shigemitsu for execution of the contract.⁸⁷ Shichida inquired about the payment to the Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry, because Shichida had not received notice from the bank about payment for the quinine. The Director answered that the cheque had already arrived. However, he seized it, because there was a cable stating that the negotiations about the transport of quinine from Tokyo to Mānzhōulī had not reached an agreement and thereby the delivery of quinine was not being made. Accordingly, Shichida told the Director that Shichida was going to ask Tokyo by cable to deliver the quinine immediately. After negotia-

⁸³ The former (and present) Trans-Baikal Railway (Забайкальская железная дорога) between Xenievskaya and Pterovsky Avod was called the Vyacheslav Molotov Railway. (A. J. Grajdanzev "The Trans-Siberian Railway and the Problem of USSR Supply", *Pacific Affairs* 14(4), 388-415, 1941.) Perm (Пермь) was called Molotov (Молотов) between 1940 and 1957.

⁸⁴ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.478 on 7 December 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁸⁵ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.489 on 14 December 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁸⁶ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.114 on 21 December 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁸⁷ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.495 on 14 December 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

tion, the payment of Afghani 307,240 was made in cash on 22 December. Shichida asked Shigemitsu, based on this situation, to finish the execution of the contract immediately.

23 December 1943 Political Director agreed to inform the Afghan Envoy

Shichida conveyed the content of telegram No.114 from Shigemitsu on 21 December⁶⁷ to the Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry. The Director answered that he would send a telegram to the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo to confirm that (1) Afghan Envoy in Tokyo should receive the quinine in Tokyo, and (2) the transport of quinine from Tokyo to Manchukuo-USSR border to be supported by Japanese side, however, its cost should be paid by the Envoy in Japan.

5 January 1944 Immediate delivery requested

Political Director of Afghan Foreign Ministry asked Shichida to facilitate the immediate delivery of quinine on 4 January, since the Director received a telegram from the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo that the Envoy had not received the quinine and that it takes 2 months for transport to the Manchukuo-USSR border.⁸⁸ Shichida told the Director that the attitude of the Afghan Envoy failed to stress the urgency of quinine in Afghanistan and gave an impression that Afghan side considers this as an ordinary trade. Shichida then advised the Director to instruct the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo to contract Takeda immediately and to ask the Japanese MFA to accelerate the transport. The Director wrote a telegram in front of Shichida to send immediately and asked Shichida to assist in the immediate dispatch of the quinine. Shichida accepted the request and asked Shigemitsu to accelerate the delivery and transport as far as possible, in spite of the difficulties, because Shichida had already received the payment.

8 January 1944 Negotiations about the transport transferred to Kabul

Shigemitsu instructed Shichida to transfer the negotiation concerning the transport of quinine from Tokyo to Kabul.⁸⁹

The Japanese MFA negotiated with the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo about the delivery and transport of the quinine. The Japanese side agreed to skip the sales agreement but just to take a receipt. As for the transport, the Japanese side intended to let Takeda to make a transport contract with the Afghan Legation. However, the Afghan Envoy tended to become emotional and placed blame on Japanese suggestions. As such an attitude might complicate the situation without meaning, the Vice Minister of the MFA declared that anything concerning this matter should be discussed in Kabul on 7 January.

The Japanese MFA was not in a hurry. However, considering the situation on the Afghan side, and to avoid confusion, Shigemitsu instructed Shichida to negotiate with the Afghan side along following lines and to inform Shigemitsu about the results by cable.

(a) The 500 kg of quinine will be transported as the property of Afghanistan. It will be packed in 10 cases of 50 kg. We cannot make a promise on the date of delivery in Mānzhōulǐ due to the traffic situation. However, we expect delivery at the end of February.

(b) The cost of packing, portage to Mānzhōulǐ and insurance premium (expected to be JPY 6,000, to be cabled as soon as established) will be paid in Kabul.

(c) In case of the loss of quinine during the transport to Mānzhōulǐ, payment will be refunded to Afghan side.

8 January 1944 Confirmation of the transfer of negotiation

Shigemitsu, in spite of the telegram from Shichida on 5 January that arrived after the telegram of Shigemitsu at 6:10 on 8 January, confirmed that negotiations about transport of the quinine should be transferred from Tokyo to Kabul in order to exclude the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo for smooth negotiation.⁹⁰

10 January 1944 Political Director agreed to the suggestion of Shigemitsu

Shichida reported to Shigemitsu that he con-

⁸⁸ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.1 on 5 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁸⁹ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.2 on 8 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁹⁰ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.3 at 17:00 on 8 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

veyed the content of two telegrams from Shigemitsu on 8 January to the Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry.⁹¹ The Director was happy with the idea of Shigemitsu and told that he is going to provide agreement as soon as he receives Japanese suggestions in writing. Shichida had no objection on the exchange of papers, however, asked if Shichida can cable the agreement of the Director in order to accelerate the matter. The Director had no objection to cabling to relay the agreement of Afghanistan, because he regretted the attitude of the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo and had wished to suggest something along the same lines. The Director also said he wished to have Japanese suggestions in writing after the cabling, if there is any necessity to discuss payment with the Afghan Department of Hygiene. Shichida agreed.

14 January 1944 Inquiry about the USSR agency to receive the quinine in Mānzhōulǐ

Shigemitsu instructed the Japanese Envoy in Mānzhōulǐ⁹² to find out immediately if it is Iransovtrans or Vostokintorg that will receive 10 cases of 50 kg quinine for Afghanistan in Mānzhōulǐ. Shigemitsu also instructed the sending of a staff member of the Japanese Legation at the arrival of quinine to confirm the handing over and to receive a receipt document from the Soviet agency.⁹³

16 January 1944 Memorandum of agreement from Afghanistan

Shichida received the memorandum of agreement from the Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry on 16 January in response to the Japanese suggestions in writing, which Shichida sent to the Director.⁹⁴

17 January 1944 No representative of Iransovtrans or Vostokintorg in Mānzhōulǐ

The USSR Envoy in Mānzhōulǐ answered to the question of Matsuda, stating that he had not received any information about this quinine transport, and that he was going to ask the USSR MFA,⁹⁵ because neither Iransovtrans nor Vostokintorg has representatives in Mānzhōulǐ.⁹⁶

18 January 1944 Shigemitsu required to define the consignee in Mānzhōulǐ

Shigemitsu passed on the report from Matsuda to Shichida and instructed him to have Afghanistan redesignate the consignee in Mānzhōulǐ from Iransovtrans and Vostokintorg and to request the USSR to send clear instructions on receiving the quinine to the assigned consignee.⁹⁷

21 January 1944 Vostokintorg became the consignee

Shichida informed the Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry about the request of Shigemitsu concerning the consignee.⁹⁸ The Director stated that Vostokintorg will be the consignee and made a phone call in front of Shichida to the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Kabul. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires agreed to cable the USSR MFA to ask for instruction to the Soviet Envoy in Mānzhōulǐ about the quinine transport and consignee.

25 January 1944 Confirm USSR Legation in Mānzhōulǐ

Shigemitsu sent a telegram to Matsuda in Mānzhōulǐ,⁹⁹ passed on the report of Shichida about the consignee, and instructed Matsuda to inquire of the USSR Envoy in Mānzhōulǐ if he has received instructions from the USSR MFA about the quinine transport and the consignee.

30 January 1944 Dispatch of a representative of Vostokintorg to Mānzhōulǐ

Matsuda visited Zabelin,¹⁰⁰ the Soviet Envoy

⁹¹ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.10 on 10 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁹² Matsuda Masatsuna (松田正綱) (JACAR Ref. B09042097500)

⁹³ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Matsuda No.5 on 14 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁹⁴ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.18 on 16 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁹⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR took refuge in Kuybyshev (Куйбышев, presently Samara/Самара) from October 1941.

⁹⁶ Telegram from Matsuda to Shigemitsu No.7 on 17 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁹⁷ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.6 on 18 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁹⁸ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.25 on 21 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

⁹⁹ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Matsuda No.6 on 25 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

in Mǎnzhōulǐ.¹⁰¹ Zabelin promised to contact USSR MFA immediately. He considered that there is no USSR transport representative in Mǎnzhōulǐ and therefore Vostokintorg should send a representative to Mǎnzhōulǐ for the handing over. Zabelin, presumably reminded by Iran-sovtorg, asked Shichida about the final destination and if there is need for package inspection at the arrival of the goods in Mǎnzhōulǐ.

30 January 1944 Inquiry of Zabelin about the shipper

Zabelin visited Matsuda to introduce the recently arrived representative of Zabaikal Railway¹⁰² and informed Matsuda that he had received instruction from the USSR's MFA about the handing over of quinine in Mǎnzhōulǐ but no instructions about the consignee.¹⁰³ Zabelin wished to know the shipper on the Japanese side. Shichida conveyed this message to the Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo.

1 February 1944 Inquiry to Takeda about the payment and handling

Asakai Koichiro,¹⁰⁴ Head of the Wartime Economic Affairs Section of the Japanese MFA¹⁰⁵ asked Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited about payment for the transport of quinine for Afghanistan.¹⁰⁶

7 February 1944 Confirmation of shipper and consignee

Shigemitsu informed Matsuda that the shipper was Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited and the consignee was the government of Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷

7 February 1944 Inquiry about the payment for

transport and expected arrival in Mǎnzhōulǐ

The Afghan Foreign Ministry asked Shichida if the payment for the transport was paid at the time of handing over in Mǎnzhōulǐ or beforehand.¹⁰⁸ Shichida answered that there is no problem if the payment was made at the time of handing over. As the Prince Minister of Army asked about the transport situation, Shichida answered that Japanese side was operating according to the agreement. Shichida asked Shigemitsu about the expected date of the hand-over in Mǎnzhōulǐ.

7 February 1944 Dispatch of quinine

Shigemitsu informed Shichida about the dispatch of quinine and gave instructions to receive the payment for the transport.¹⁰⁹ Based on the information from Zabelin to Matsuda, Shigemitsu considered the situation of the hand-over in Mǎnzhōulǐ was not yet clear. Therefore, the Japanese side dispatched quinine into the care of Japanese Legation in Mǎnzhōulǐ. The payment for the freight, packing, insurance (inclusive of extra premium for the war situation), and communication was JPY 4,116.55.¹¹⁰ Shigemitsu instructed Shichida to convert this amount into Afghan currency and let Afghan side pay that amount to Japanese Legation in Kabul.

10 February 1944 Expected hand-over in Mǎnzhōulǐ in early March

Shigemitsu informed Shichida that the quinine is expected to be handed over to Vostokintorg in Mǎnzhōulǐ in early March.¹¹¹

14 February 1944 Use of quinine payment

Since Shichida considered that the quinine transaction this time was completed, he was

¹⁰⁰ Alexandr Ivanovich Zabelin (Александр Иванович ЗАБЕЛИН) once was the consul at the USSR's General Consulate in Sapporo from 1940 to 1942. (Генконсульство России в Саппоро "История Генконсульства"; <https://sapporo.mid.ru/istoria>)

¹⁰¹ Telegram from Matsuda to Shigemitsu No.9 on 30 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁰² A railway running between two border stations, Mǎnzhōulǐ and Zabaikalisk connecting to Tarskaya-Zabaikal branch line (Бетарская - Забайкальская) of Siberian Railway.

¹⁰³ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.12 on 30 January 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁰⁴ 朝海浩一郎 (1906-1995)

¹⁰⁵ 外務省戦時経済局

¹⁰⁶ Telegram from Asakai to Kubo Tougo (久保藤吾) of Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited No.1186 on 1 February 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁰⁷ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Matsuda No.9 on 7 February 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁰⁸ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.41 on 7 February 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁰⁹ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.11 on 7 February 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹¹⁰ Roughly equivalent to present JPY 2,085,000-3,118,000.

¹¹¹ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.13 on 10 February 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

spending the payment on expenditures during the 4th quarter of FY 1943 and for salaries for December 1943. The rest he reserved for expenditures during the 1st quarter of FY 1944, as there was no expectation to get Afghan currency. He also requested fees for telegrams.

23 February 1944 Carrier and route

Shigemitsu informed Matsuda that the carrier was Nippon Express and route was via Korea, and that the bill of cargo to be sent to Japanese Legation in Mānzhōulǐ should be handed over to the representative of the USSR side in exchange with cargo receipt.¹¹² Shigemitsu also noticed that the cargo will be dispatched within a few days and expected arrival will be mid-March.

27 February 1944 USSR Legation in Mānzhōulǐ will take care of handing over

The Political Director of the Afghan Foreign Ministry informed Shichida that it would take a few more days for the payment of transport. However, he received an official document from the USSR Embassy stating that the Soviet Envoy in Mānzhōulǐ is making all the arrangements concerning the handing over of the quinine in Mānzhōulǐ.¹¹³ The Director asked Shichida to instruct the Japanese Envoy in Mānzhōulǐ to make contact with the Soviet Envoy there.

1 March 1944 Quinine dispatched on 28 February

Quinine was dispatched on 28 February.¹¹⁴

13 March 1944 Receipt of the payment for the transport

Shichida reported to Shigemitsu that the payment of Afghani 12,647.68 (rate 307.24 Afghani for JPY 100) for the transport of the quinine was received today.¹¹⁵ As the Afghan side inquired about the transport situation, Shichida asked

Shigemitsu to inform him about the hand-over at Mānzhōulǐ.

13 March, 1944 Instructions to report as soon as the quinine is handed over.

Shigemitsu instructed Matsuda to report the handing over of the quinine in Mānzhōulǐ as soon as possible.¹¹⁶

22 March 1944 Sending of the waybill, invoice and a letter from Takeda

Shigemitsu informed Matsuda that the waybill, invoice and a letter from Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited to the Japanese Legation in Mānzhōulǐ will be sent, and instructed that Matsuda should send a staff member to confirm the hand-over and to receive the receipt from the USSR side, and send to the receipt to Tokyo.¹¹⁷

1 April 1944 Arrangements with the Manchukuo Department of Economy

Shigemitsu informed Matsuda about the request to the Manchukuo Embassy in Tokyo to cable the Manchukuo Department of Economy in order to consult about the customs clearance of the quinine.¹¹⁸

2 April 1944 Instruction to request the smooth customs clearance

Shigemitsu sent a telegram to Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo, Umezu Yoshijiro,¹¹⁹ to explain the nature of the cargo and to request the permission for customs clearance without import permission to Manchukuo.¹²⁰ Shigemitsu explained as follows. The cargo concerned, 500 kg of quinine, was promised by the Japanese government to Afghanistan and was expected to be handed over in Mānzhōulǐ to the consignee Vostokintorg representing Afghanistan in the presence of the Japanese envoy, according to the request of Afghanistan. However, the Japanese

¹¹² Telegram from Shigemitsu to Matsuda No.13 on 23 February 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹¹³ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.66 on 27 February 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹¹⁴ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.17 on 1 March 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹¹⁵ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.88 on 13 March 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹¹⁶ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Matsuda No.20 on 13 March 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹¹⁷ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Matsuda Wartime Economic Affairs Section No.2 on 22 March 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹¹⁸ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Matsuda No.23 on 1 April, 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹¹⁹ Umezu Yoshijiro (梅津 美治郎, 1882-1949) was a Japanese Army officer, serving as the Commander of the Kwantung Army as well as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo from September 1939 to September 1944.

¹²⁰ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Umezu No.74 on 2 April 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

envoy in Mǎnzhōulǐ reported that the cargo dispatched from Osaka by Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited was not able to enter Manchukuo and stagnated in Āndōng, because the cargo was not accompanied by import permission of Manchukuo. Accordingly, the MFA requested the Manchukuo Embassy in Tokyo to assist in customs clearance. The cargo is a transit cargo and the destination is written as Mǎnzhōulǐ, because the cargo will be handed over to the Afghan representative there. Shigemitsu asked Umezu to explain this situation to Manchukuo and request smooth clearance by Manchukuo without import permission.

4 April 1944 Quinine stagnating in Āndōng

Shigemitsu informed Shichida about the present situation of quinine transport,¹²¹ that the cargo arrived in Āndōng at the end of last month, however stagnated there because of doubt at the customs clearance due to a mistake in the documents provided by Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited. Shigemitsu also explained that the Japanese MFA had requested immediate customs clearance by Manchukuo and therefore expects the cargo to arrive in Mǎnzhōulǐ soon.

10 April 1944 Inquiry about the response of Manchukuo

Shigemitsu sent a telegram to Umezu requesting information on the response of Manchukuo about the customs clearance of the quinine.¹²²

12 April 1944 Manchukuo instructed to send quinine as bonded goods

Umezu reported to Shigemitsu after the negotiation with Manchukuo that Department of Economy of Manchukuo instructed Āndōng Custom Office on 10 April to send the cargo as bonded goods, and that Manchukuo wished the cargo to

be sent directly to USSR territory without handing over inside of Mǎnzhōulǐ Station (the entire station was a bonded area) after sufficient arrangements among the Japanese Envoy, the local custom office, and other concerned parties.¹²³

13 April 1944 Instructions for immediate hand-over

Shigemitsu informed Matsuda that the consignment sheet for quinine was sent by courier in late March and instructed Matsuda to finish the hand-over in accordance with the telegram from Umezu to Shigemitsu, and to report.¹²⁴

14 April 1944 Umezu informed the actual cause of delay

Umezu informed Shigemitsu about actual cause of the delay of quinine cargo and about the effort to accelerate as follows.¹²⁵ The stagnation of quinine in Āndōng was not due to the import or customs clearance procedure (the shipper finished the procedure for bonded transport to Mǎnzhōulǐ), but due to the congestion of the traffic. Since there were no prior notice, the cargo was postponed at the transfer between wagons. Therefore, Umezu made a special arrangement to accelerate the transportation not only in Āndōng but also in Sūjiātún and two other places, and expected the arrival of the cargo in Āndōng around 20 April. Umezu advised Shigemitsu that such a transport result in difficulties both in custom clearance and railway transport, and therefore it was better to inform all parties well in advance.¹²⁶

17 April 1944 Quinine cargo will be sent after sealing

Matsuda informed Umezu¹²⁷ that it was agreed by Matsuda, the Soviet Envoy and the

¹²¹ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.26 on 4 April 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹²² Telegram from Shigemitsu to Umezu No.84 on 10 April 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹²³ Telegram from Umezu to Shigemitsu No.62 on 12 April 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹²⁴ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Matsuda No.26 on 13 April 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹²⁵ Telegram from Umezu to Shigemitsu No.67 on 12 April 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200) This telegram indicates the difference in the capacity to obtain information in Manchukuo between Kwantong Army, of which Umezu was the commander, and the MFA. The advice of Umezu also tells us the relationship between Umezu and Shigemitsu, both of whom were members of the delegation signing capitulation in August 1945.

¹²⁶ This communication indicates the power relationship between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the commander of the Kwantong Army, who was at the same time the subordinate of Shigemitsu.

¹²⁷ Telegram from Matsuda to Umezu No.42 cited from the telegram from Matsuda to Shigemitsu No.53? (one letter not legible) on 17 April 1944.

representative of Zabaikal Railway that the quinine cargo will be sealed at Mǎnzhōulǐ and Otpor¹²⁸ and will be handled as a through-cargo in order to avoid trouble during the passage through the USSR, though the cargo was destined for the Zabaikal Railway in Mǎnzhōulǐ and potentially the Zabaikal Railway can handle the cargo at their will. Matsuda has already obtained the agreement of Manchukuo Custom Office to seal the cargo according to the request of Zabaikal Railway.

18 April 1944 Expected arrival in Mazhouli on 20 April

Shigemitsu informed Umezu that the delayed quinine cargo was expected to arrive in Mǎnzhōulǐ on 20 April, thanks to the arrangements of Manchukuo to accelerate the transportation in spite of busy traffic.¹²⁹

21 April 1944 Quinine handed over

Matsuda reported Shigemitsu that the quinine managed by a staff member of Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited in Mukden arrived in Mǎnzhōulǐ on 20 April and was handed over to the representative of Zabaikal Railway on 21 April without trouble.¹³⁰ According to the representative of Zabaikal Railway, a staff of Vostokintorg came to Otpor to relay the quinine in Otpor and send to the destination immediately.¹³¹ Matsuda also informed that the receipt will be sent per post and asked to convey the present telegram to Japanese Envoy in Afghanistan.

22 April 1944 Information about the relay of quinine to Shichida

Shigemitsu informed Shichida about the arrival of the quinine in Mǎnzhōulǐ on 20 April and its hand-over to the representative of Zabaikal Railway on 21 April.¹³² Shigemitsu also reported that a staff member of Vostokintorg came to Otpor to relay and immediately sent the cargo to the destination.

20 May 1944 Procedure to receive the payment

The Afghan Vice Foreign Minister asked Shichida about the procedure of payment, since the Afghan Envoy in Tokyo requested Swiss Franc 57,676 (Afghani 174,753).¹³³ Shichida answered that it is most convenient if Afghanistan pays that amount in Afghani to the Japanese Legation in Kabul and the Japanese MFA pays the same amount to Afghan Legation in Afghani. Vice Minister had no objection on the additional payment, however, asked for the payment in Japan in Swiss Franc to the bank account indicated by the Afghan Envoy in Japan. Shichida answered that he will ask Tokyo. Shichida suggested to Shigemitsu the possibility of paying the Afghan Envoy in JPY or USD cash and have the Afghan government to pay the equivalent Afghani to the Japanese Legation in Kabul, and asked Shigemitsu to negotiate with the Afghan Envoy.

20 June 1944 Acknowledgement of the quinine and request for further 500 kg

The Director of Political Affairs of the Afghan Foreign Ministry conveyed the gratitude of Ministers of Army and Hygiene for the almost safe delivery of quinine on 19 June.¹³⁴ According to the Director, the Army first required the entire amount and then compromised and took a half. This went completely beyond the planning of the Ministry of Hygiene for allocation of quinine. This and the expected increase in patients due to the climate this year pushed the Minister of Hygiene to ask the Director of Political Affairs to request to Shichida to arrange for an additional 500 kg of quinine. Shichida answered that it would be difficult to supply a further 500 kg, because Tokyo considers the first 500 kg is already too much. The Director then told Shichida that there was no statistical data in this regard and the figure he produced was a guess work based on requirements of Institutes under Ministry of Hygiene, state factories, state hospit-

¹²⁸ Otpor (Орпор) is the former name of Zabaikalsk (Забайкальск). Otpor/Zabaikalsk was the first station after crossing the Manchukuo/USSR border.

¹²⁹ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Umezu No.36 on 18 April 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹³⁰ Telegram from Matsuda to Shigemitsu No.55 on 21 April 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹³¹ Very likely Termez (Термез), now in Uzbekistan near the Hairatan border crossing of Afghanistan.

¹³² Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.38 on 22 April 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹³³ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.189 on 20 May 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹³⁴ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.231 on 20 June 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

als and the Army. Including provision of quinine to private pharmacies and for use by civilian patients, hygiene experts consider even 5,000 kg insufficient, and therefore, there will be no risk of diversion to other countries if Japan provided an additional 500 kg. The Director thus entreated Shichida to assist in obtaining an additional supply of 500 kg. Shichida answered that he will convey the request of the Director to Tokyo, although Shichida was not sure about the opinion of Tokyo.

20 June 1944 Shichida requested an additional 500 kg

Shichida suggested Shigemitsu to accept the request for an additional 500 kg of quinine; besides the need for Afghan currency, this would help to oppose a recent stratagem to draw Afghanistan into the anti-axis side by providing precious gifts to the Royal Family and high-ranking officers.¹³⁵ Both the contract medical officer Dr. Watanabe and Turkish hygiene advisors whom Shichida contacted also had the same opinion as the Director and ensured that the risk for diversion should be minute. Accordingly, Shichida requested consideration of supplying an additional 500 kg.

22 June 1944 Request for the confirmation of delivery

Shigemitsu instructed Shichida to confirm the delivery of quinine to Afghan government and report.¹³⁶

13 July 1944 Loss of quinine during the transport

Shichida reported Shigemitsu about the loss of quinine during the transport.¹³⁷ A staff member of the Japanese Legation, invited by the Ministry of Hygiene, was present at the opening of the cargo on 12 July and found that (1) two 5 kg cans are short in box No.2. Cover paper for 2 cans was left in the box. There was no anomaly

of lead seals of Manchuokuo Custom and Afghanistan Border Custom. (2) Five out of the 98 cans were weighed and found the reduction of average 50 g per can. Therefore, Japanese Legation confirmed these facts in writing, according to the request of Afghan side.

30 August 1944 Inquiry about the additional 500 kg of quinine by Director of Political Affairs

Watabe, the Charge d'Affaires of the Japanese Legation in Kabul, reported to Shigemitsu that Watabe answered the inquiry of the Director of Political Affairs of the Afghan Foreign Ministry about the supply of a further 500 kg of quinine and told the Director to wait for the return of Shichida¹³⁸ within a few days.¹³⁹

11 September 1944 Supply of further 500 kg is possible

Shigemitsu informed Shichida that the supply of a further 500 kg of quinine is ready and instructed Shichida to inform the Afghan side when he considers it appropriate, although the price became higher, with more-or-less the same cost for transportation as before.¹⁴⁰

17 September 1944 Director of Political Affairs acknowledged Japanese offer

Shichida reported the result of the meeting with the Director of Political Affairs of Afghan Foreign Ministry on 16 September as following.¹⁴¹ The Director expressed gratitude for the Japanese offer of a further 500 kg of quinine and asked for the detailed conditions. Shichida promised to forward the inquiry. The Director also asked if it is possible to start the negotiations with the USSR, because arrangement for transport through the USSR takes time. Shichida answered that there would be no problem if Afghanistan accepts the higher price.

18 September 1944 Price of the additional 500 kg of quinine

¹³⁵ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.232 on 20 June 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹³⁶ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.65 on 22 June 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹³⁷ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.261 on 13 July 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹³⁸ Shichida left Kabul for Moscow for an official trip on 15 July 1944 and arrived in Moscow on 30 July 1944. He returned in Kabul on 31 August 1944. (JACAR Ref. B14091235500)

¹³⁹ Telegram from Watabe Shinanotaro (渡部信濃太郎) to Shigemitsu No.300 on 30 August. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁴⁰ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.108 on 11 September 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁴¹ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.335 on 17 September 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

Shigemitsu reported the price of the quinine and the conditions of transport to Shichida and instructed him to transmit these to the Afghan side.¹⁴² The price of 500 kg of quinine will be JPY 140,000¹⁴³ FOB in Tokyo, due to the increase in transport cost from Indonesia and the requirements in Japan. Transport conditions and the place of delivery are as before. However, the trading agency/shipper will be Trade Corporation.¹⁴⁴ The cost for transport may be a little higher.

23 September 1944 Conditions transmitted to the Afghan side

Shichida reported Shigemitsu about the immediate transmission of quinine price and transport conditions to Afghan side in writing.¹⁴⁵

27 September 1944 Request to discount

Shichida reported Shigemitsu about the result of the meeting with the Director of Political Affairs on 27 September.¹⁴⁶ Director expected a 10 to 15% increase in price and arranged with the Ministry of Hygiene along these lines. However, he found that the increase in price by 40% was difficult to squeeze from the budget. Although Director recognizes how impolite it is, the Director asked Shichida if it was possible to convey his wish to reduce the price. Shichida answered that the price Japan set was just the cost and a reduction in price would inflict a loss on the Japanese side, and therefore he considers it hard to accommodate the wish of the Director. Nevertheless, the Director entreated Shichida to convey his wish to Tokyo, especially considering the poor financial situation of Afghanistan. Shichida answered that he will convey the message of the Director, however, he reminded the Director that he cannot expect too much.

7 October 1944 Afghanistan accepted full price

Shichida reported to Shigemitsu about the statement of the Director of Political Affairs on 7

October.¹⁴⁷ The Director related that the Afghan side succeeded in allocating the money for the full price and asked Japan to supply the quinine at its original price and condition, as if there were no negotiation or bargaining. The Minister of Hygiene had reported the results of the meeting with Shichida on 27 September to the Prince Minister of the Army. The Prince Minister of the Army said to the Minister of Hygiene that the request for discount was hard for Shichida to transmit to Japanese MFA, and therefore Afghan side should make every effort to pay the full price. Ultimately, the Ministry of the Army decided to pay more. The Prince Minister of the Army asked the Director to sincerely explain such a circumstance to Japanese side in order not to waste the good will of Japan. The Director asked Shichida to convey this to Tokyo. The Afghan side was ready to pay the full price at any moment. However, they wished to finish the payment and asked for the immediate dispatch when the permission of the USSR for passage of the cargo is set.

29 November 1944 Transport permission of the USSR obtained

Shichida conveyed the message of the officer of the Afghan Foreign Ministry on the transport of quinine to Shigemitsu as follows.¹⁴⁸ Afghanistan obtained permission for the quinine transport through the USSR territory. The Afghan side wished to know the procedure of the hand-over at Mazhouli as well as the final transport charge between Tokyo and Mānzhouli. Shichida answered that he was reporting this to Tokyo and explained that Afghanistan should finish the payment as a prerequisite for this transaction. Shichida requested Shigemitsu to prepare for the dispatch and to provide an answer to the above inquiries.

12 December 1944 Payment received

Shichida reported to Shigemitsu the receipt of

¹⁴² Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.111 on 18 September 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁴³ Roughly equivalent to current JPY 70,000,000 – 106,000,000.

¹⁴⁴ A unitary control administration organization of Japanese trade established on June 8 1943, mainly handling steel, nonferrous metal, textiles, chemicals, pharmaceutical products and raw materials. (*Sankei Shinbun* newspaper on 8 June 1943)

¹⁴⁵ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.340 on 23 September 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁴⁶ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.346 on 27 September 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁴⁷ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.363 on 7 October 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁴⁸ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.428 on 29 November 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

Afghani 430,136, equivalent to JPY 140,000 (Afghani 307.24 for JPY 100) on 12 December and asked for the immediate dispatch of quinine and for notice to the USSR Official in Mǎnzhōulǐ about the expected arrival there.¹⁴⁹

16 December 1944 Details of transport arrangements

Shigemitsu instructed Shichida to suggest the following conditions of transport to the Afghan side.¹⁵⁰ Quinine is under preparation for immediate dispatch. There was difficulty in the hand-over in Mǎnzhōulǐ last time; the quinine was first handed over to the representative of Zabaikal Railway in Mǎnzhōulǐ and then further handed over to Vostokintorg in USSR territory, because there was no representative of Vostokintorg in Manzhouli. Therefore, it is better to make Zabaikal Railway the consignee. Shigemitsu also instructed Shichida to request the Afghan side to inform the Soviet Envoy in Mǎnzhōulǐ about this quinine transport well in advance.

5 January 1945 Vostokintorg will be the consignee

Shichida reported to Shigemitsu the reply of a councilor of Soviet Embassy in Kabul to the inquiry of Afghanistan that Vostokintorg will send a representative to the USSR-Manchukuo border to receive the cargo.¹⁵¹

15 January 1945 Scheduled arrival in Manzhouli and transport charge

Shigemitsu informed Shichida that the quinine will be dispatched from Osaka¹⁵² around 20 January and is expected to arrive in Mǎnzhōulǐ at the beginning of March.¹⁵³ The transport charge is JPY 5,239.35¹⁵⁴ including insurance and other expenses.

15 January 1945 Instructions to the Japanese Ambassador in Manchukuo

Shigemitsu informed the Japanese Ambassador in Manchukuo, Yamada Otozou,¹⁵⁵ about the quinine transport as follows. A decision has been made to supply 500 kg of quinine to Afghanistan. The quinine will be handed over to Vostokintorg, the consignee representing Afghanistan, in Mazhouli as before. The quinine will be dispatched from Osaka by Trade Corporation around 20 January. The cargo number and package will be sent after dispatch. It is necessary to request Manchukuo to facilitate passage of the cargo through the territory of Manchukuo. The MFA is planning to send an envoy, Furukawa Yasushi, to Xīnjīng¹⁵⁶ and Mǎnzhōulǐ. Convey this message to Mǎnzhōulǐ.

15 January 1945 Order for Furukawa Yasushi to go to Manchukuo

MFA ordered Furukawa Yasushi to go to Manchukuo on 16 January 1945.¹⁵⁷

15 January 1945 Official trip plan for Furukawa

The Imperial Government of Japan decided to supply the government of Afghanistan 500 kg of quinine and is planning to dispatch the quinine on about 20 January to hand over to the consignee representing Afghanistan in Mǎnzhōulǐ.¹⁵⁸ The MFA is to send Envoy Furukawa to Manchukuo in order to make arrangements with Manchukuo for the passage of the quinine through Manchukuo and to carry the waybill. Departure from Tokyo on about 22 January. Return to Japan about late February.

8 February 1945 Expected dispatch of quinine

Shigemitsu informed Yamada in Manchukuo about the dispatch of delayed quinine cargo with-

¹⁴⁹ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.448 on 12 December 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁵⁰ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.141 on 16 December 1944. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁵¹ Telegram from Shichida to Shigemitsu No.10 on 5 January 1945. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁵² The head office of Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited was in Osaka.

¹⁵³ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.4 on 15 January 1945. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁵⁴ Roughly equivalent to current JPY 820,000 - 2,630,000.

¹⁵⁵ Yamada Otozou (山田乙三, 1881-1965) was the Commander of Kwantung Army and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo from July 1944.

¹⁵⁶ Capital of Manchukuo. Presently Chángchūn.

¹⁵⁷ Draft of government order for Furukawa issued by Head of Personnel Department, MFA on 15 January to be announced on 16 January 1945. (JACAR Ref. B14091541300)

¹⁵⁸ Draft for the decision on the trip of Furukawa to Manchukuo issued by Director of Wartime Economic Affairs, MFA on 15 January and approved on 15 January 1945. (JACAR Ref. B14091541300)

in a few days.¹⁵⁹ Shigemitsu also related that details such as the cargo number would be provided as soon as they are available, but Envoy Furukawa who goes to Xīnjīng and Mǎnzhōulǐ carrying waybill would provide details.

20 February 1945 Compensation for quinine lost during transport

Shigemitsu suggested to Shichida that compensation for quinine lost during transport as follows.¹⁶⁰ The representative of Zabaikal Railway in Mǎnzhōulǐ wrote on the back surface of the invoice “Here I received the 10 pieces of cargo (quinine) 766 kg in gross weight to be relayed to Afghanistan as written on the surface” and signed it. That cargo was originally promised to hand over to Afghan side in Tokyo. It was as a favor that we agreed to transport the cargo to Mǎnzhōulǐ. Therefore, it is clear that we were not responsible for loss of quinine during the transport. However, considering the situation Shichida had explained, Shigemitsu had no objection to providing a discount of approximately JPY 2,000 from the next freight charge and to inform the Afghan side about this, while Shichida should make it clear that this discount was not for compensation but from good will of Japanese side.

28 February 1945 Request to accelerate the dispatch

The Director of Wartime Economic Affairs, MFA sent a letter to the Director of Planning, Trade Corporation as follows.¹⁶¹ The 500 kg of quinine which Imperial Government promised to supply to Afghanistan, by agreement with the staff of the Department of Planning, was to be dispatched on about 20 January from Japan and to be handed over in Mǎnzhōulǐ at the latest in late February. This schedule was relayed to the Afghanistan side. The Afghanistan side is arranging for receipt of the cargo in Mǎnzhōulǐ along this line. However, the dispatch of the cargo was delayed for more than 1 month and has

not been dispatched yet. Thus it is not possible to hand over the cargo as planned. This makes the Afghan arrangement for the hand-over difficult. Such a serious delay should reduce the effect of our goodwill and should have unfavorable influence on both Afghanistan and the USSR, the latter of which has undertaken the transport. Therefore, please make further effort for the immediate dispatch of the cargo concerned.

28 February 1945 The delay informed to Yamada in Manchukuo

Shigemitsu informed Yamada, the Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo, about the delay of the dispatch of quinine and that the dispatch will take place within 10 days.¹⁶²

30 March 1945 Try to receive quinine before the delivery of documents

The Director of Wartime Economic Affairs of the Japanese MFA sent a message to Envoy Furukawa temporarily in Mǎnzhōulǐ.¹⁶³ The Director informed Furukawa that documents concerning the quinine transport had been re-issued after revision due to the delay in dispatch and should be delivered to Furukawa directly from Trade Corporation. However, it is meaningless to postpone receiving until delivery of the documents. Furukawa was instructed to try to somehow receive the cargo and hand it over to the USSR representative without revised documents. If necessary, the content of the revised documents will be cabled.

There was no record in JACAR or otherwise concerning the further development of this quinine trade. It is yet unclear if the second lot of quinine was actually dispatched or not.

3.3.2. Spain

26 August, 1943 Request from Spain

The Japanese Envoy Extraordinary to Spain,

¹⁵⁹ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Yamada No.75 on 8 February 1945. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁶⁰ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Shichida No.13 on 20 February 1945. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁶¹ Letter from Director of Wartime Economic Affairs, MFA to Director of Planning, Trade Corporation sent on 18 February 1945. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200) This letter took 10 days between drafting and dispatch.

¹⁶² Telegram from Shigemitsu to Yamada No.135 on 28 February 1945. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁶³ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Matsuda No.54 on 30 March 1945. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

Suma Yakichirou,¹⁶⁴ conveyed the request of Spain for purchase of quinine.¹⁶⁵ The Spanish MFA asked for the export of quinine in accordance with a request from medical associations and various ministries based on the serious spread of malaria. The ministry expected to use the opportunity of the departure of a Japan-USA exchange ship; the allied side ensured the safe passage of this transaction. The Spanish MFA also asked about the amount and price. Suma asked for acceptance of this request and to sell as much as possible not only from the humanitarian aspect, but also to repay Spanish work as a representative country and for help in the exchange with allied countries. Suma also pointed out that the sales would improve the serious financial problem of Japanese diplomatic establishments in Europe. Suma suggested that the Spanish request be considered out of goodwill because of the spread of Malaria in Spain and lack of any other source for quinine, in spite of the concern of quinine being passed on to enemies, and that it may be a good idea to request monitoring of the use of quinine by Japan.

7 September 1943 Request from Suma for reply

Suma requested a quick reply against the Spanish request for quinine.¹⁶⁶

7 September 1943 Refusal of Spanish request

Shigemitsu refused the proposal of Spain.¹⁶⁷ There had been proposals for the purchase of quinine from various neutral countries such as Portugal.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, the Spanish proposal was carefully considered. However, production capacity at the moment and more importantly military concerns led us not to supply quinine to Spain.

4. Discussion

Japan donated 3, 4 and 6 tons of quinine to Thailand, the Philippines and French Indochina, respectively. Considering the planned annual production at Bandung of 200 tons in FY 1942 as

stated above, the donated amount of 13 t was equivalent to 6.5% of annual production. Therefore, this was a rather generous amount. Moreover, the quinine sulfate donated to Thailand should have been equivalent at least to 240,000 yen and have covered ca. 1/3 of annual peace time necessity in Thailand. Therefore, this again shows that the quinine was a significant gift.

The price of quinine should reflect the relationship between Japan and the recipient country/area. Countries and territories under the Japanese umbrella such as Thailand, the Philippines or French Indochina received a donation of at least 3 tons of quinine. The price offered to an axis country, Bulgaria, was JPY 500,000 for 5 tons (JPY 100/kg). The domestic price of quinine in 1942 was JPY 80,000/t (JPY 80/kg) as stated above. Thus, the price offered to Bulgaria was not high. It is not easy to convert the price for Bulgaria to a value in contemporary Japanese Yen, however, a rough estimation would be current JPY 60,000 – 85,000/kg.¹⁶⁹ This is cheaper than the current price of quinine sulfate in Japanese National Health Insurance (JPY 118.1/g = 118,100/kg.) On the other hand, the price offered to Afghanistan was JPY 200/kg for the first lot, and JPY 280/kg for the second lot. The price for neutral Afghanistan was set significantly higher than that for axis Bulgaria.

In contrast to the price, efforts for completion of the first quinine shipment to Afghanistan was remarkable. The geographic importance of Afghanistan adjacent both to India and the USSR must have been the main motivation. Sending a diplomat to Afghanistan by itself was quite an enterprise. It took Shichida approximately 40 days to travel from Japan to Kabul via Korea, Manchukuo and the USSR including crossing a desert on foot and a five-day car ride.¹⁷⁰ The planned route for the transport of quinine was again via Korea, Manchukuo and the USSR. There were many cables among Japan, Afghanistan and Manchukuo about the place of delivery,

¹⁶⁴ Sumiya Kichiro (須磨 弥吉郎, 1892 – 1970) was Envoy Extraordinary to Spain from 1941 to 1945.

¹⁶⁵ Telegram from Suma to Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigemitsu No.911 on 26 August 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁶⁶ Telegram from Suma to Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigemitsu No.961 on 7 September 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁶⁷ Telegram from Shigemitsu to Suma No.347 on 7 September 1943. (JACAR Ref. B09042315200)

¹⁶⁸ The record of the proposal from Portugal was not found in JACAR.

¹⁶⁹ Conversion based on <https://yaruzou.net/hprice/hprice-calc.html>.

¹⁷⁰ Record of MFA on the travel of Shichida. (JACAR Ref.B14090895300)

way of payment, and the consignee at the Manchukuo-USSR border.

Transport across Manchukuo from Āndōng to Mǎnzhōulǐ for a bond cargo took time. Communication among the MFA, the Japanese Ambassador in Manchukuo (*i.e.* Commander of the Kwantung Army) and Manchukuo was not ideal. Accordingly, this path took longer than expected. Another difficulty was the transmission at the Manchukuo-USSR border. As there was no representative of a USSR trading company on the Manchukuo side (Mǎnzhōulǐ), the hand-over plan was amended to hand-over the quinine to the representative of a USSR railway company connecting two border stations, Mǎnzhōulǐ and Otpor (Zabaikalsk), and then to the representative of the USSR trading company Vostokintorg. As a result, the transmission of the cargo dispatched from Osaka on 28 February arrived in Mǎnzhōulǐ on 21 April instead of the expected early March.

Such a tedious work involving different parties and the agreement of the MFA to supply the second lot of quinine indicate a strong Japanese inclination to maintain their diplomatic relationship with Afghanistan. Additionally, the Japanese MFA agreed to discount the freight cost of the second lot to compensate for quinine lost during the transport of the first lot. Considering that there was no fault on Japanese side for this loss, this again reflects the Japanese attitude towards Afghanistan. The question of whether the second lot of quinine was actually delivered to Afghanistan is still unclear.

I was not able to find any reports on quinine imports from Japan in the official records of the US Envoy in Kabul.¹⁷¹ This sounds odd. Because Japanese diplomatic coded communications to and from Afghanistan had already been broken.¹⁷²

Bulgaria was an axis country, which should be the reason why Japan agreed to supply quinine

to Bulgaria and set an inexpensive price. However, the materials left in JACAR show that Japan was not keen to assist in its transport. There was, at least theoretically, a possibility to transport quinine via Manchukuo and the USSR in the same way as that for Afghanistan, if we consider that Bulgaria never declared war on the USSR. However, there is no record of such an effort of Japanese MFA.

I was not able to find records on the supply of quinine to Germany during World War II in JACAR archives. Cargo ships operated by the Japanese Navy under the code name “Gyaku-Yanagisen” (counter-willow ship) carrying badly needed materials for the European Axis powers’ war effort usually circumnavigated Africa between 1941 and 1944.¹⁷³ They also carried 68,117 tons of other essential materials, mostly from Southeast Asia, such as tungsten, tin, and quinine, and altogether about two-thirds of the German annual requirement for these items.¹⁷⁴ Further, submarines carried 2,606 tons of vital raw materials (mainly tin, rubber, tungsten, quinine, and opium, in descending order) from Asia to Europe during 1944–45.¹⁷³ The final Japanese vessel to carry out such a mission was submarine I-52, which left Japan on 22 March 1944 with 2 tons of gold and stopped over in Singapore where it was further loaded with 3 tons of quinine along with other goods.¹⁷³ However, this voyage was not completed. Thus, there should have been a certain amount of quinine supplied from Japan to Germany and potentially to other axis countries. It is not yet clear whether the quinine intended for export to Bulgaria was included in these cargo shipments.

Japan refused the request of neutral Spain, and very likely that of neutral Portugal, for quinine. This refusal was due to the risk of diversion to enemy side. This is quite different from the Japanese reaction to Afghanistan, and indicates the importance of Afghanistan for Japan.

¹⁷¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943. The Near East and Africa*, Volume IV. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964; *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East, Volume V*. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965; *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1945*. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.

¹⁷² Sawada J. (2019), “Ahuganisutan wo meguru nihon no chōhō kōsaku katsudō (Japanese intelligence activities concerning Afghanistan – mainly between 1934 and 1945)”, *Seiji Keizai Houritsu Kenkyū* 22, 1, 77–144.

¹⁷³ R. Kowner (2017), “When Economics, Strategy, and Racial Ideology Meet: Inter-Axis Connections in the Wartime Indian Ocean,” *Journal of Global History* 12, 2, 228–250.

¹⁷⁴ M. H. Brice (1981), *Axis Blockade Runners*, Harper Collins Distribution Services, p.151.

5. Conclusion

The above chronology and discussion indicate that during World War II Imperial Japan used quinine captured and produced in Java under the Japanese Occupation as a diplomatic tool in order to strengthen friendships with occupied countries and territories such as Thailand, the Philippines and French Indochina. However, responses to requests for quinine from axis and neutral countries varied. Japan exerted a far larger effort for neutral Afghanistan than for axis

Bulgaria in the transport of quinine, although Japan offered cheaper price for the latter. Such a difference offers us a view of one important facet of diplomatic policy of Imperial Japan during World War II.

Acknowledgement

I appreciate meticulous and creative suggestions of Professor William Bradley Horton of Aki-ta University.