

THE MONEY OF THE SPIRIT

— The Young Marx's Analysis of the Homology between Political Economy and Hegel's Philosophy⁽¹⁾ —

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Foreword

In this article we clarify Marx's analysis of the homologous relation between political economy and Hegel's philosophy in the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts*⁽²⁾. The essence of his task is summarized as follows.

In the *Manuscripts* Marx had already recognized the homology of the two sciences, both of his critiques of the two sciences forming two aspects of his criterion of modern private property. The two sciences are the same in making such a mistake as to take the historical fact that persons are forced to behave *ideally* to form exchange relation in modern private property system, for the natural truth that human being is only bestowed ability to think (*causa finālis*). The human universal ability to think ideally in mind is deformed into the subjective medium (value-consciousness) of making individual private contract, the characteristic of which lies in the mutual approval to rule ideally (i.e., legally) other's private property, not violently as in pre-modern private property societies. What both A. Smith and G.W.F. Hegel took as universal truth should be translated to the bourgeois fact. That is his lifetime theme from the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts* to *Capital*. The *Paris Manuscripts* never shows us that he abandoned Hegel's philosophy, estimating it without any scientific significance and took up the French and English political economy, but that he found the homology between the two sciences, sliding his investigating focus from Hegel to Smith. The *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts* is the monumental document of his discovery of the homology.

We trace the process of his discovery of the homology in the *Third Manuscripts*, in which it is documented more evidently than in the others (the *First* and *Second Manuscripts*). His investigation is divided into the following ten phases;

1. Critique of Political Economy (1) (Private Property and Labour) [pp. 128, 1.2-

- 131, 1.37 ; S.257-260] (3)
- 2 . Critique of Political Economy (2) (Private Property and Communism) [pp.132, 1.3-146, 1.13 ; S.261-275]
 - 3 . Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 【1】 [pp.170, 1.4-174, 1.35 ; S.275-278]
 - 4 . Critique of Political Economy (3) (Desire, Production and Division of Labour (1)) [pp.147, 1.3-153, 1.16 ; S. 279-284]
 - 5 . Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 【2】 [pp.175, 1.1-176, 1.38 ; S. 284-286]
 - 6 . Critique of Political Economy (4) (Desire, Production and Division of Labour (2)) [pp.153, 1.17-158, 1.14 ; S.286-292]
 - 7 . Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 【3】 [pp.177, 1.1-193, 1.22 ; S. 292-306]
 - 8 . Critique of Political Economy (5) (Desire, Production and Division of Labour (3)) [pp.158, 1.15-164, 1.16 ; S. 306-314]
 - 9 . Foreword [pp.63, 1.1-64, 1.29 ; S. 314-317]
 10. Critique of Political Economy (6) (Money) [pp.165, 1.3-169, 1.38 ; S. 318-322]

§ 1 The Idealistic Character of Private Property in Political Economy

At the beginning of the *Third Manuscripts*, Marx analyzes the nature of political economy as follows.

“The *subjective essence* of private property — *private property* as activity for itself, as *subject*, as *person* — is *labour*. It is therefore evident that only the political economy which acknowledged *labour* as its principle (Adam Smith), and which therefore no longer looked upon private property as a mere *condition* external to man — that it is this political economy which has to be regarded on the one hand as a product of the real *energy* and the real *movement* of private property — as a product of modern *industry* — and on the other hand, as a force which has quickened and glorified the energy and development of modern *industry* and made it a power in the realm of *consciousness*”. (p. 128)

In the quotation above are found two problems.

Firstly, according to Marx, A. Smith grasped for the first time in the history of

political economy that modern private property, the main form of which is the industrial capital, is posited [ist gesetzt] by alienated labour, which is *for itself* (ist für sich) against capital and actualize itself in the capital ownership. Methodologically speaking, what is posited at the beginning is the principle of scientific demonstration. *The Wealth of Nations* begins with division of labour. A. Smith himself puts division of labour at the beginning to show it as fundamental cause of wealth. Marx, however, finds *private* division of labour changes human activity into estranged labour. A. Smith *unconsciously* posits alienating principle at the beginning of *The Wealth of Nations*.

Secondly, capital realizes capitalist consciousness in political (national) economy. Marx defines political economy as independent movement of modern private property which has become *for itself* in consciousness, that means private property is generally based upon the *legal* rule of other's labour, and modern private property (capital) commands other's labour not through violence to other's physical body, but through *ideal* contracts with others, i. e., through the relation between commodity-owner and money-owner. Upon that is founded the ideal characteristic of modern private property⁽⁴⁾.

Subjects including wage-workers have to participate in market as persons with *ideal* consciousness to get means of *material* life.

As commodity transforms into money, money into capital, so the ideal consciousness of persons in the bourgeois society develops to capitalist consciousness. Political economists defacto analyze the capitalist consciousness and demonstrate it systematically in *material* terms. *The Wealth of Nations* is one of the representatives of the analysis and demonstration. It is the science of capitalist consciousness which rules not only physical commodities, but also human labour-commodity through *ideal* contracts⁽⁵⁾.

However, because of his *material* standpoint, A. Smith does not analyze the *private* form of bourgeois wealth and the *private* labour which produces the wealth. Therefore, Marx insists —

“Under the semblance of recognizing man, political economy whose principle is [estranged] labour, rather carries to its logical conclusion the denial of man, since man himself no longer stands in an external relation of attention to the external substance of private property, but has himself become this essence of private property.” (pp. 128-129)

The political economy has defacto grasped that the subjective essence of modern private property is estranged labour. Through the recognition, it has found itself related to anthropology (humanities). In the case of A. Smith, his study of man in civilized society in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, the main categories of which are "self-interest and sympathy", is succeeded to *The Wealth of Nations* as *propensity to exchange* (Bk. I, ch. 2). But, the labour that A. Smith defines is neither one in such a state where man and nature are immediately united, nor one as the activity of human species-being.

The labour is rather one in a state (bourgeois society) where man and nature, mind and body are divided and connected *socially* through selling-buying relation; it is the *alienated* labour. What is alienation? According to Marx's definition, it is *social* separation of man and nature and that of mind and body. The bourgeois economy makes such a specific use of human mind (*causa finālis*) as to connect ideally other's separated property; man and nature, mind and body.

The four divided factors exist in such economic forms as mental labourer (capitalist), physical labourer (wage-worker), commodity or money-owner (man) and commodity and money (nature; in concrete forms, land and products of labour). In exchange relation, repeatedly in their everyday-life, persons as commodity-owners have to estimate how much value their commodities have.

Value is abstract, therefore persons in market have to measure value in mind. What is imagined in mind is *ideal* par excellence. They have to think ideally in order to measure the value of their commodities. In this way, exchange relation develops specific (bourgeois) forms of abstract-ideal thought, which is *social consciousness* as social products. What is essential to human being, ability to think ideally has thus become inevitable means to connect alienated (socially separated) factors of human life (man and nature, mind and body). Political economy looks upon the alienation as natural state of life, in fact affirms the estrangement and negates human activity as species-being.

There are two forms to rule others' labour; one is to rule products of their labour, the other is to command directly their living labour. Marx has already grasped the mediate relation of the two forms in the *First Manuscripts*. In the first half of the

manuscripts, he followed political economists (esp. A. Smith) who insisted that modern private property (capital) is the cause to alienate labour. In the second half (*Alienated Labour*), on the contrary, Marx analyzed the result, alienated labour in order to discover the cause of private property (capital).

Human being as result of natural history was born with mind and body immediately united, as universal appropriator of nature. Such primitive community has been destroyed through primitive accumulation, and mind and body, man and nature have been socially separated through exchange relation. Each of the four factors has become object of modern private property. Such a state of society is the bourgeois society, which, however, appears as *natural-universal* state of society to political economists. Capital as the subject of the society is growing to be more value, the embodiment of which, money, connects the separated factors.

Man is bestowed with mental ability upon physical by nature. Alienated (physical) labour of wage-worker is the *material* cause and mental (ideal) labour of capitalist is related to natural history *mediately* through rule of the former (physical labour). Therefore, alienated labour is the real cause of capital and capital is the result. Capital, the highest form of private property, is born in and relates to one stage of natural history through ruling estranged labour. The principle of modern private property is that of division of labour. It penetrates not only products of labour (means of life and production), but living labour itself, and brings about division of labour among classes.

As man and nature, mind and body are socially separated, they must be connected through exchange relation. Human activities in the society are torn into *real-material* production and *ideal-formal* exchange of products.

The separation begins *within* persons. They engage in their material production, then they go to market where they exchange their products each other. When the separation spreads out through the society, division of labour between classes is realised₍₆₎; the mental labourer (capitalist) and the physical labourer (wage-worker), the possessor and the possessed. Metabolism between man and nature is firstly realised through capitalist investment. Therefore capitalist production appears *real production*. Marx writes —

“My *general* consciousness is only the *theoretical* shape of that which the *living*

shape is the *real* community, the social fabric, although at the present day *general* consciousness is an abstraction from real life and as such confronts it with hostility. The *activity* of my general consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my *theoretical* existence as a social being.” (p.137)

Such a specific mode of life as bourgeois economy forces persons in the society to perform *ideal* praxis par excellence in their private exchange. The exchange starts from performance of the commodity-owners to evaluate the commodity. As exchange-value is abstract, it necessarily needs and realizes its own subject, “general consciousness”. Money is the material embodiment (Materiatur) of “general (ideal) consciousness”. It is the form to rule material production. So it appears naturally that *material* subject (money) rules *material* object (production and product). That is why bourgeois economy appears as natural-universal system of life. Marx thus begins to analyze the fetishism of bourgeois economy.

“The worker’s *real, practical attitude* in production and to the product (as a state of mind) appears in the non-worker confronting him as a *theoretical attitude*.” (p. 119)

Here in the *Third Manuscripts*, Marx describes the same relation between the alienated labour and the capitalist property, the real activity and the ideal theoretical rule of the living labour and its product, as follows.

“In his *consciousness of species* man confirms his real *social life* and simply repeats his real existence in thought, just as conversely the being of the species confirms itself in species-consciousness and exists for *itself* in its generality as a thinking being.” (p. 138)

In the bourgeois economy, metabolism between man and nature begins with commodity-money relation; so it is *social* metabolism. *Material* transformation (Stoffwechsel, metabolism) in the bourgeois economy operates after and through *formal* transformation (private exchange). Persons in real material production are connected equally in the bourgeois generality, *value-abstraction*. They combine themselves generally in the abstract consciousness. Their intersubjectivity forms itself in the abstract consciousness. The abstract value-consciousness rules material production. The bourgeois economy, thus, inevitably posits its own specific ideal totality.

“Man, much as he may therefore be a *particular* individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real *individual* social being), is just as much the *totality* — the ideal totality — the subjective existence of thought and experienced society for itself; just as he exists also in the real world as the awareness and the real mind of social existence, and as a totality of human manifestation of life.” (p. 138)

Man lives double totality. Firstly, he connects many particular activities into one *material totality*, because his life (body) is an organic totality. At the same time (secondly), he posits his *material* life *ideally* in his consciousness and representation. The bourgeois economy, however, separates the double totality into the *ideal* praxis (exchange) and the *real* poïēsis (material production). Human mind in the bourgeois economy is deformed into the subjective factor of ideal (legal) rule of private property. The deformation is expressed in the modern industry.

“We see how the history of *industry* and the established *objective* existence of industry are the *open book* of *man's essential powers*, the exposure to the senses of human *psychology*. Hitherto this was not conceived in its inseparable connection with man's *essential being*, but only in an external relation of utility, because, moving in the realm of estrangement, people could only think of man's general mode of being — religion or history in its abstract-general character as politics, art, literature, etc. — as the reality of man's essential powers and *man's species activity*. We have before us the *objectified essential powers* of man in the form of *sensuous, alien, useful objects*, in the form of estrangement, displayed in *ordinary material industry* ……” (p. 142)

Psychology in the quotation above has no contemporary sense of the word. As to the word, Marx thinks of Aristotle's *De Anima*, the science of *psychē*, where Aristotle distinguished living existences on the earth according to what kind of ability (*psychē*) they are born with. Man only is born with ability to think (*causa finālis*), which no plants and animals have. Marx here thinks of, so to speak, phenomenology (*genesis*) of human mind or consciousness, and keeps in mind Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in which Hegel transformed *positive reason* to be independent from human body in *De Anima* into *Idea* as substance and subject. Psychology Marx cited above has, first of

all, the Aristotelian-Hegelian sense.

The development of human mind, however, should not be understood simply in the course of *natural* history as in the Aristotelian description, but be traced through the history of *alienation*. Hegel himself described alienation of self-consciousness, which really signifies man *within thinking*. According to Hegel, ideal subject [Idea] objectifies itself, thus substance becomes subject, and what is objectified appears alien object to the subject and it annuls the alienation.

Marx succeeds the two methods of Aristotle and Hegel, and traces the *phenomenology* of human mind in the real development of modern industry. So Marx writes,

“History itself is a *real* part of *natural history* — of nature developing into man.”

(p. 143)

The modern industry is the last alienated form of genesis of man in natural history.

“Just as through the movement of *private property*, of its wealth as well as its poverty — or of its material and spiritual wealth and poverty — the budding [werdend] society finds at hand all the material for this *development*, so *established* [geworden] society produces man in this entire richness of his being — produces the *rich man profoundly endowed with all the senses* — as its enduring reality.” (p. 141)

Productive powers of the bourgeois industry is the reality which shows the highest level of *human history in alienation*, which, however, unconsciously prepares subjective and objective conditions to transfer to *human history without alienation*. The quotation above gives the evidence that Marx locates the bourgeois society in the last stage of *pre-history*, i. e. history of private property societies. In what form is then the idea to rule upon other's labour and its results through private property expressed? In language.

“The element of thought itself — the element of thought's living expression — *language* — is of a sensuous nature.” (p. 143)

Fish cannot live without water. As water is the vital element of the life of fish, so man cannot live spiritual life without language. It is the vital element for man to think. Hegel's *Science of Logic* (logos > language) is the study of *thinking* itself with and in language. It is Hegel's unconscious abstract expression of the bourgeois thought or consciousness proper to modern private property owners. Marx therefore changes the

object of his inquiry from political economy (1) · (2) to Hegel's philosophy 【1】.

§ 2 The Money of the Spirit — The Bourgeois Character of Hegel's Philosophy —

The sentence that we find the most notable in the first phase of Hegel-critique is as follows.

“*Logic* (the *money* of the spirit [das *Geld* des Geistes], the speculative or *thought-value* of man and nature — their essence grown totally indifferent to all real determinateness, and hence their unreal essence) is *alienated thinking*, and therefore thinking which abstracts from nature and from real man: *abstract thinking*.”
(p. 174)

Marx defines Hegel's *Logic* as the money of the spirit. In the same context, Marx quotes the following sentence from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

“When it [the spirit] declares that what it does it does out of a conviction of duty, this utterance is the *validating* [das *Gelten* 【*Geld*: Marx's parenthesis in his note (MEGA, IV-2, S. 497.)】] of its *action*.”⁽⁷⁾

Is Marx's definition that Hegel's *Logic* is the *money* of the spirit just an economical rhetoric of philosophical content? Never. The characteristic of modern private property is that it legally rules other's commodity through value-relation, through which capitalist organizes material production, getting productive labour and means of production connected. He thus *ideally* transforms wage-worker's real activity into his own. Marx has found the same kind of *ideal* transformation in Hegel's *Logic*, which takes the same role of *money* that moves (posits) man and nature in bourgeois economy. That is because Marx defines Hegel's *Logic* as the *money* of the spirit.

Citing the example from the *Holy Family*, there really exist many forms of fruit, then man may ideally abstract *fruit in general* in mind. Hegel converts the process. He insists that firstly fruit in general is as *substance* and it posits many particular forms of fruit as *positive subject*. According to him, the Spirit as substance objectifies itself, so it becomes ideal subject.

Such a mode of demonstration as describes as if the *ideal substance* as subject would posit the *real existence* is found both in political economy and Hegel's philosophy. The

homologous ground of the two sciences is the ideal-subjective character of modern private property. The universal truth of man that he only is born with ability to think is alienated through modern private property. The ability is separated from immediate producers socially through exchange-relation. What is proper to the bourgeois property appears as if it were universally proper to man. The ideal-subjective character of the modern private property is *materialized* in money.

Money is the power to rule wealth in market. It moves everything and everybody as commodity. It moves man and nature, mind and body. Marx thinks that the *metamorphosing* — in the Goethe's sense — power of money is homologous to the creative power of the abstract subject. *Idea* in the *Encyclopaedia* posits itself (in Science of Logic), nature (in Philosophy of Nature) and man (in Philosophy of Spirit). Both critique of political economy and that of Hegel's philosophy are connected homologously as the critique of the *idealism* of modern private property, the bourgeois ideology, which unconsciously expresses the state where an ideal subject (*value* or *Idea*) is dominant.

§ 3 The Power of Money and the Need for Money

After grasping the homology between the two sciences, Marx comes back to the political economy (3). To begin with, he writes as follows.

“ [Under private property] each tries to establish over the others an *alien power*, so as thereby to find satisfaction of his own selfish need. The increase in the quantity of objects is accompanied by an extension of the realm of the alien powers to which man is subjected, and every new product represents a new *possibility* of mutual swindling and mutual plundering. Man becomes ever poorer as man, his need for *money* becomes ever greater if he wants to overpower hostile being. The power of his *money* declines so to say in inverse proportion to the increase in the volume of production: that is, his neediness grows as the *power* of money increases.

The need for money is therefore the true need produced by the modern economic system, and it is the only need which the latter produces. The *quantity* of money becomes to an ever greater degree its sole *effective* quality. Just as it reduces everything to its abstract form, so it reduces itself in the course of its own

movement to *quantitative* being. *Measureless* and *intemperance* come to be its true measure." (p. 147)

As the ideal subject (*Idea*) of *Logic* posits itself, nature and man, so in the political economy money rules and moves man and nature. Money does not *really* produce man and nature, but *ideally* rules them. The power of man is deformed to that of money in the political economy. In the *Alienated Labour* of the *First Manuscripts*, Marx has clarified the alienated relation between living labour and product of labour. But the task is put off later to analyze essential relation between *money-system* and the whole alienation. It has started here in the *Third Manuscripts*. Marx, however, has not succeeded in demonstrating the genesis of money (value-form and exchanging process), which he begins in *Grundrisse*.

Now, he points out that all needs in the bourgeois economy are concentrated into the need for money, estranged form of the essential power of man. Money appears not only as means to get material products to satisfy individual desires, but as the end itself in the bourgeois society.

What is notable in the quotation above is that Marx makes use of Hegel's doctrine of *Being*, i. e. logic from *quantity* via *measure* to *measureless*. The movement of money for itself ($M \cdots M'$) is that for the sake of more money ($\Delta M = M' - M$) and it transforms to quantity. *Quantity* in Hegel's sense is not a simple quantity indifferent to *quality*, but unity which combines qualitative differences. Therefore quantity has the power to rule quality. Hegel's quantity is homologous to money which rules particular qualities (use-values) of commodities. In order to be more powerful, money has to be more and more, endless quantity. Endless quantity is *measureless*. Money tends to grow to infinity.

Money of such sort is substantially equal to capital (money as capital). Money as capital organizes real production through commodity-money exchange. It *metamorphoses* into productive labour and production-means to be more money. Capitalist as personification of capital recommends wage-workers to be industrious and save money, as if he would successfully have become capitalist because he had been patiently industrious and parsimonious. On the other hand as commodity-seller in market, he seduces wage-workers as consumers to buy commodity. Economists like Malthus, Lauderdale

speak in place of the capitalist. Marx reveals the inconsistency between production and consumption in the bourgeois economy.

“The Say-Ricardo school, however, is hypocritical in not admitting that it is precisely whim and caprice which determine production. It forgets the “refined needs”; it forgets that there would be no production without consumption; it forgets that as a result of competition production can only become more extensive and luxurious. It forgets that it is use that determines a thing's value, and that fashion determines use. It wishes to see only “useful things” produced, but it forgets that production of too many useful things produces too large a *useless* population. Both sides forget that extravagance and thrift, luxury and privation, wealth and poverty are equal.”(p. 151)

Marx shows that the controversy over extravagance and thrift in the field of political economy is grounded upon the private separation of production and consumption. Production for production has no purpose of people's welfare, but that of more money. The result it brings about is mass-production, huge products. Capitalists inevitably persuade people into luxurious life, most of whom are wage-workers being dissuaded from such a life. They are ordered to save and live thriftily in capitalist factory, and are recommended to be extravagant in market. The contradiction is based upon capitalist separation of production and consumption; in the former they participate as wage-workers, in the latter as consumers with money which they have earned as wage-workers. The division of wealth on one side and poverty on the other raises moral questions. The bourgeois economy causes the question as necessary evil.

The development of political economy as science is a process in which it grasps objective laws of the bourgeois economy and understands that the antagonism between capitalist's wealth and wage-worker's poverty is the inevitable consequence of capitalist development. The history of political economy from J. Locke to D. Ricardo has manifested cynicism within itself. Political economy was born in the tradition of moral philosophy as in the case of A. Smith, which had united ethics and economics. Political economy, however, now outcasts moral questions which are brought about in the course of bourgeois development, and thus the problematic of how to solve moral questions through economics has been dissolved.

“But whom am I now to believe, political economy or ethics? The ethics of political economy is *acquisition*, work, thrift, sobriety — but political economy promises to satisfy my needs. The political economy of ethics is the opulence of a good convenience, of virtue, etc. ; but how can I live virtuously if I do not live? And how can I have a good conscience if I am not conscious of anything? It stems from the very nature of estrangement that each sphere applies to me a different and opposite yardstick — ethics one and political economy another ; for each is a specific estrangement of many and focuses attention on a particular round of estranged essential activity, and each stands in an estranged relation to the other.” (p. 151 – 152)

The ethics of political economy delivered upon wage-workers in production is ethics for acquisition, industry and thrift for capitalist to get more money. The political economy of ethics upon wage-workers as consumers in market preaches them to be legal. As A. Smith analyzed in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, how *self-interest* and *sympathy* as human nature unconsciously organize civil society, and demonstrated in *The Wealth of Nations* how division of labour among *homo economicus* with such nature opulently produces wealth and distributes it even to lower classes of the society, though there may be inequality in distribution. He called such a society “the system of natural liberty”. In this way A. Smith united ethics and economics, and optimistically forecasted the development of the system.

Marx, on the contrary, finds the cause that dissolves the connection between ethics and economics. Bourgeois economics develops to be a science which treats the antagonism between the rich and the poor as natural phenomenon, at the most regards the problem as one indifferent to itself and leaves it to ethics.

Marx has already fulfilled the task to analyze the cause of the antagonism in the second half of the *First Manuscripts*. Here in the *Third*, he investigates the cause to alienate labour and finds that *money* divides and estranges labour. A. Smith insisted that division of labour is the very cause of wealth of nations. What divides labour? He thinks that propensity to exchange fixes some kind of labour in which man occasionally engages.

Marx, however, insights that *money* divides not only labour but man and nature,

physical labour and mental, production and consumption. According to him, what A. Smith calls *propensity to exchange* is the very norm for man to live within money-system, the subjectified axiom of the system⁽⁸⁾.

The bourgeois principle of division moreover separates political economy and ethics. The history of political economy to sophisticate as science from A. Smith to D. Ricardo is the process where human being disappears from the sphere of the science ; i. e. , the process to outcast the moral issues from the science and indulge in studying mechanism of bourgeois economy. Marx understands that capital, the subject of bourgeois society, is destined to move in order to get more money, and that bourgeois economy systematically brings about moral problems, however political economy inevitably becomes cynical science interested only in causal analysis, indifferent to well-being of people. Thus, theoretical recognition of objective laws (causality) and practical realization of social welfare (teleology) are divided. Marx *cynically* points out the *scientific sincerity* of D. Ricardo as follows.

“Thus M. *Michel Chevalier* reproaches Ricardo with having abstracted from ethics. But Ricardo is allowing political economy to speak its own language, and if it does not speak ethically, this is not Ricardo’s fault. M. Chevalier abstracts from political economy in so far as he moralizes, but he really and necessarily abstracts from ethics in so far as he practices political economy. The relationship of political economy to ethics, if it is other than an arbitrary, contingent and therefore unfounded and unscientific relationship, if it is not being put up as a *sham* [*Schein*] but is meant to be *essential*, can only be the relationship of the laws of political economy to ethics.”(p. 152)

The indulgence in researching causality and the loss of teleology are two aspects of the development of political economy. He thinks that, in the bourgeois society, mental life is separated into many genres, just as bourgeois economy divides science and ethics.

“..... moving in the realm of estrangement, people could only think of man’s general mode of being — religion or history in its abstract-general character as politics, art, literature, etc. — as the reality of man’s essential powers and *man’s species activity*.”(p. 142)

The question is how to approach to the separation of production and consumption in

material life, and to that of science and ethics in mental life. First of all, you have to grasp the causal relation of the separation and have to penetrate real potential which will emancipate people from bourgeois alienation through recognition of the estrangement. You have to search conditions to realize *telos* (welfare) in the capitalist development and to unite the scientific causality and the moral teleology. For the task, you have to define capital as subjective process moving independently and rejecting human virtue. Hegel himself defined "Idea" as such. Now, Marx returns to Hegel [2] to get some methodological suggestions.

§ 4 The Abstract Characteristic of Hegel's Definition of Alienation

How does Hegel grasp the alienation of human essential power which appears in alienated forms of wealth and poverty, while political economy casts ethical problem of the poverty without scientific inquiry of social laws? Indeed, he knows and defines alienation and its annulment [Aufhebung], but he understands the process of alienation and recovery from it *within abstract process of thought*.

"When, for instance, wealth, state power, etc., are understood by Hegel as entities estranged from the *human* being, this only happens in their form as thoughts They are thought-entities, and therefore merely an estrangement of *pure*, i. e., abstract, philosophical thinking. The whole *history of the alienation process* and the whole *process of the retraction* of the alienation is therefore nothing but the *history of the production* of abstract (i. e., absolute) thought — of logical, speculative thought." (p. 175)

For Hegel, the retraction of the alienation is a simple action in abstract-absolute thinking. He estimates the idealistic character of modern private property as not historical, but natural, which *ideally* rules and appropriates other's real material production. The wealth and poverty in bourgeois economy is, however, *real* alienation.

Firstly, Hegel accepts the appropriation of alienated results of human activity, i. e., the retraction of the alienation as simple action within consciousness, pure thought, abstraction.

Secondly, Hegel defines the alienation and the subject who annuls it as abstract

thinker. For example, in the *Phenomenology*, objects which man has posited appear as “abstract consciousness”, and man as “self-consciousness”. In other words, the objects and the subject are distinguished *ideally within consciousness*. Both of them are ideal beings, so the recovery from the alienation is a simple *ideal* incident, but the *real* alienation still exists without consciousness. Why does Hegel grasp the alienation in such a way? Because for him,

“Only *spirit* is the *true* essence of man, and the true form of spirit is thinking spirit, the logical, speculative spirit. The *human character* of nature and of the nature created by history — man’s products — appears in the form that they are *products* of abstract spirit and as such, therefore, phases of *spirit — thought entities*. The *Phenomenology* is, therefore, a hidden and mystifying criticism — still to itself obscure.” (p. 176)

Political economy describes the real of history of industry and analyzes its economic laws, but is indifferent to ethical questions of bourgeois society, while Hegel philosophizes the ideal nature of bourgeois private property as idealism and deforms the real owners and their properties into ideal subject and object within consciousness. According to him, the object appears alien as *consciousness* and the alienation is annulled when the subject gets aware of it as the objective aspect of *self-consciousness*. Thus, Marx reveals Hegel’s “merely *apparent* criticism” (p. 184).

At the same time, Marx analyzes what is *rational* in Hegel’s explanation.

“But inasmuch as it [the *Phenomenology*] grasps steadily man’s *estrangement*, even though man appears only in the shape of spirit, there lie concealed in it *all* the elements of criticism, already *prepared* and *elaborated* in a manner often rising far above the Hegelian standpoint.” (p. 176)

Hegel’s idealism is based upon the ideal characteristic of modern private property. He misunderstands bourgeois *ideal* rule of other’s *real* activity as natural appropriation. He makes the universal demiurgos, the creator of nature and man, of alienated abstract spirit which would create the bourgeois society. In the same way and sense, political economy takes it for granted that money, the ideal subject which is materially embodied in gold or silver, rules nature (land, products of labour) and man (wage-worker). Marx clarifies both Hegel’s philosophy and political economy are homologous as the

sciences of bourgeois alienated spirit which ideally dominates man and nature.

§ 5 Reproduction and Accumulation of Capital in the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts*

Now, Marx turns back from critique of Hegel to that of political economy (4). He writes such a system of critique of political economy as follows.

“We have already seen how the political economist establishes the unity of labour and capital in a variety of ways:

- (1) Capital is *accumulated labour*.
- (2) The purpose of capital within production — partly, reproduction of capital with profit, partly, capital as raw material (material of labour), and partly, as itself a *working instrument* (the machine is capital directly equated with labour) — is *productive labour*.
- (3) The worker is a capital.
- (4) Wages belong to costs of capital.
- (5) In relation to the worker, labour is the reproduction of his life-capital.
- (6) In relation to the capitalist, labour is an aspect of his capital's activity.

Finally, (7) the political economist postulates the original unity of capital and labour as the unity of the capitalist and the worker; this is the original state of paradise.

The way in which these two aspects, as two persons, leap at each other's throats is for the political economist an *accidental* event, and hence only to be explained by reference to external factors. (See Mill.)” (p. 153)

Firstly, judging from that Marx reflects about what he has already seen, it is sure that he has considered about the contents that the paragraphs (1)–(7) show somewhere before. As at the end of the *First Manuscripts*, he planned to analyze the capitalist relation to worker from the side of non-worker, capitalist, we can assume that the contents of the paragraphs (1)–(7) have been developed after the end of the *First Manuscripts* and before the head of the *Third Manuscripts*.

Secondly, concerning Marx's definition that capital is accumulated labour, according to Smith's definition, he has not proved that capital firstly takes form of money and

circulates in the form (M – M). Indeed, he has grasped that estranged power of human species-being appears as the power of money, but he has not distinguished yet whether the money is simple money or money-capital.

Thirdly, in the paragraph (2) above, moments of capital in production are divided into the three : material and machine (means of production) and productive labour. Capital is defined to be reproduced with profit which is the source of the life-fund of capitalist. Marx writes,

“To be sure, the industrial capitalist also takes *his* pleasures. He does not by any means return to the unnatural simplicity of need ; but his pleasure is only a side-issue — recreation — something subordinated to production ; at the same time it is a *calculated* and, therefore, itself an *economical* pleasure. For he debits it to his capital's expense account, and what is squandered on his pleasure must therefore amount to no more than will be replaced with profit through the reproduction of capital.”(157)

Marx points out the contradiction between capitalist production and consumption. Capitalist consumption is never his purpose in life, but is merely reproduction of himself as capital owner, just as worker's consumption is reproduction of himself as wage-worker. If capitalist indulges in pleasure over profit of capital, capital itself is exhausted, then he is no capitalist.

Fourthly, in the paragraph of (3)–(6) above, Marx defines labour of wage-worker in the relation to capitalist and in that to worker himself. Capitalist pays cost (wage) to get labour as subjective moment of capital in production. Labour is a life-capital for worker, selling it to capitalist for money-wage to buy life-means.

Fifthly, in the last paragraph (7), he suggests the theme of primitive community and primitive accumulation, which is one point of Marx's critique of A. Smith. Indeed, Smith talks about the difference between the rude state of society where all products of labour belong to immediate producers and the civilized state of society where only a part of all products is distributed to them, but he never explains how the difference has been realized, nor how the former state of society has been deformed to the latter. In the *German Ideology*, Marx firstly describes the course of primitive accumulation⁽⁹⁾.

What is notable is the fact that he has changed the order of description from primitive

accumulation to capitalist accumulation (reproduction) (pp. 126–127), to that from capitalist accumulation to primitive accumulation in the *Third Manuscripts*. Why? The change suggests his critique of Hegel's endless circle. Hegel develops mutual reversion between cause [Ursache] and result [Wirkung]. Marx locates bourgeois economy as (the last) *developing society* in the natural-universal history through which man develops himself. Marx analyzes factors of reproduction (accumulation) of capital which he uses as tool to trace how elements of reproduction of capital have been born and connected in the course of primitive accumulation.

Marx intends to reveal that Hegel's endless logical circle is the abstraction of capitalist reproduction. The abstraction lets Hegel assume that capitalist economy is permanent system.

Hegel proves preposition (what is pre-posed) is posited in result and logical past is reproduced in logical present (result). Marx, after the proof, traces how *logical* past (preposition) itself is posited by *historical* past. In such a way, Marx shows capitalist economy was *historically* born, therefore it is open to past and is a historical individual which has emerged from historical past.

Having analyzed moments of capitalist accumulation, Marx writes as follows.

“Pleasure is therefore subsumed under capital, and the pleasure-taking individual under the capital-accumulating individual, whilst formerly the contrary was the case. The decrease in the interest rate is therefore a symptom of the annulment of capital only inasmuch as it is a symptom of the rule of capital in the process of perfecting itself — of the estrangement in this process of becoming fully developed and therefore of hastening to its annulment. This is indeed the only way in which that which exists affirms its opposite.” (pp. 157–158)

Reproduction and accumulation of capital accomplish themselves. The old private property (land property) has been subsumed under the new (capital property). That is deepening of estrangement as well as annulling of it. Objectification of human potential appears as estrangement in which gradually matures some possibility to overcome itself. Political economy is indifferent to such sort of logical complex of estrangement. Assuming that Hegel may have prepared it in his philosophy, Marx now turns to Hegel [3].

§ 6 Hegel's Standpoint of Modern Private Property

In the third critique of Hegel's philosophy, Marx tries to draw out *positive* moments in Hegel's philosophy, studying his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, *Philosophy of Law* and *Encyclopaedia*.

Marx's economic theories of capitalist accumulation clarify that capitalist economy is a historical individual which posits its own preposition (what is pre-posed) as results of capitalist production, and expands its specific mode of production, alienating human ability in form of conflict between rich capitalist and poor wage-worker. Capitalist reproduction spreads and expands its system which alienates human species-power. What kind of significance does bourgeois economy have as the last stage of "developing societies" (class societies) for "the developed societies" (classless societies) ? With such a problematic in his mind, Marx studies Hegel, searching a method to define the significance. Is Hegel aware of human alienation as such or not ? Does he try to dig out some positive moments to annul it or not ? Does he mistake historical alienation for natural one just as national economists ?

Marx attains what is positive in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, through its investigation as follows.

"The outstanding achievement of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and of its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this an alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of *labour* and comprehends objective man — true, because real man — as the outcome of man's *own labour*. The *real*, active orientation of man to himself as a species being, or his manifestation as a real species being (i. e., as a human being), is only possible by the utilization of all the *power* he has in himself and which are his as belonging to the *species* — something which in turn is only possible through the cooperative action of all of mankind, as the result of history — is only possible by man's treating these generic powers as objects : and this, to begin with, is again only possible in the form of estrangement." (P. 177)

Firstly, Hegel analyzes the self-creation of human being in such three processes as

- (1) objectification,
- (2) loss of the object, i. e., alienation,
- (3) transcendence of the alienation.

Secondly, human being is understood as result of his own labour. Man cultivates (bilden) himself through his own activity.

Thirdly, the activity is not isolated, but carried out as species-being activity through which man creates total power as results of historical process.

Hegel writes at the end of the *Phenomonology* as follows.

“The movement of carrying forward the form of its self-knowledge is the labour which it accomplishes as actual History”⁽¹⁰⁾.

Referring to the recognition of labour above, Marx describes,

“The *forming* of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present.” (p. 141)

Marx conditionally estimates Hegel's definition of labour. Marx points out the defect of Hegel's understanding of human labour.

“Let us provisionally say just this much in advance : Hegel's standpoint is that of modern political economy. He grasps *labour* as the *essence* of man — as man's essence in the act of proving itself : he sees only the positive, not the negative side of labour. Labour is man's *coming-to-be-for himself* within *alienation*, or as *alienated* man. The only labour which Hegel knows and recognizes is *abstractly mental* labour. Therefore, that which constitutes the *essence* of philosophy — the *alienation of man in his knowing of himself*, or *alienated science thinking itself* — Hegel grasps as its essence.” (p. 177)

Marx insists that Hegel adopts the standpoint of modern political economy. What does he mean? The only labour that Hegel knows and recognizes is *abstractly mental* one. Here *abstractly* means being *alienated* or *separated* from total species-ability. If one is indulged only in mental labour, his labour is deformed one-sidedly, being separated from *physical* labour. Vice versa. According to Marx, Hegel grasps labour within *abstraction* or *alienation*. Therefore, Hegel's standpoint of political economist is that of capitalist who engages himself in *mental-spiritual* labour to evaluate his capital which is essentially *abstract*, and to get more money or value.

Man is born with body and mind immediately united in natural history. However, they are *artificially* separated in capitalist economy through exchange between capitalist and wage-worker. As political economy, typical "*alienated science*", describes capitalist mental labour commanding wage-worker to let them produce more value, so Hegel grasps human labour only in *mental* form which posits itself (Spirit), nature and man (cf. *Encyclopaedia*).

Marx insights Hegel's philosophization of commodity world where commodity-owner objectifies his value-consciousness on his own property. In the *Phenomenology*, he demonstrates that *consciousness as substance* (or *knowing* [Wissen]) becomes *subject* through positing (knowing) itself as object-consciousness and then becomes subject-consciousness, being conscious of itself as *object-consciousness*. Marx exposes that what Hegel calls self-consciousness is bourgeois selfish man, "abstract egoist" (p. 178), commodity-owner. "Self" is consciousness of ownership of thing (Sache). It is subjectification of the relation of commodity exchange, i. e., *value*. Therefore, self-consciousness is *value-consciousness*₍₁₁₎. What Hegel defines object-consciousness, thinghood (Dingheit) are nothing but objectification of value-consciousness. According to Hegel, thinghood is "alienated self-consciousness" (p. 180), "an abstract thing, a thing of abstraction" (ibid.). The abstract that commodity-owner alienates is the value of which he is vitally conscious. Marx expresses it in "the existing and active concept of value" (p. 169). Thinghood is the value which appears in thing, or objectification (Versachlichung) of value. Marx categorizes the objectification of alienated value into *thinghood* in the *Manuscripts*.

Political economist and Hegel are the same in that they recognize only abstractly mental labour which is separated from physical. Hegel philosophizes the ideal character of modern private property, which political economist, e. g., A. Smith takes for granted as preposition of what he calls "the system of natural liberty"₍₁₂₎. Both political economist and Hegel recognize only alienated labour as subject to rule man and nature, upon which is grounded the homology of the alienated sciences.

Marx points that Hegel grasps man's act of self-genesis in the abstractly mental from of labour, as follows.

" [Man's act of self-creation appears] *as a merely formal*, because abstract,

act, because the human essence itself is taken to be only an *abstract, thinking essence*, conceived merely as self-consciousness.” (p. 188)

As political economist describes capitalist command of wage-workers’ physical real production and appropriation of the results to be capitalist property as natural action, so in the *Phenomenology* Hegel defines man as self-consciousness, thinking subject, which in fact does not *really* change and annul, but *ideally* objectifies itself (object-consciousness), loses what is objectified (alienation of object-consciousness) and appropriates what is objectified (annulment of the alienation) *within thinking or abstraction*. Therefore, everything which happens in Hegel’s philosophy is merely ideal incident. Such an idealism corresponds to capitalist ideal-legal rule of private property. The human activity which Hegel recognizes is abstract-formal behaviour [Verhalten] of man in market, which mediates exchange-relation. The labour in Hegel’s sense is alienated mental labour which subjectively maintains *value-identity* through metamorphoses in capitalist economy. The subject in Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia* is *Idea*. It is

“the *absolute subject*, as a *process*, as *subject alienating* itself and returning from alienation into itself, but at the same time retracting this alienation into itself, and the subject as this process; a pure, *restless* revolving within itself.” (p. 188)

Capitalist as personification of self-increasing value (capital) subsumes worker’s real genesis under his command and lets their potential appear as capitalist power. The perversion through capitalist ideal rule is homologous to Hegel’s *Minor Logic* in *Encyclopaedia*. Marx estimates it as follows.

“Hegel’s positive achievement here, in his speculative logic, is that the *definite concepts*, the universal *fixed thought-forms* in their independence *vis-à-vis* nature and spirit (human nature) are a necessary result of the general estrangement of the human essence and therefore also of human thought, and Hegel has therefore brought these together and presented them as moments of the abstraction-process.” (p. 189)

Marx criticizes that Hegel does not analyze the alienation of human essential power, separated into mental labour (*causa finālis*) and physical labour (*causa efficiēns*), but defines the former as natural universal subject, the demiurgos of nature and man. Such a perversion is the philosophization of modern private property with the specific

ideal character.

Following Hegel who begins his *Logic* with the simplest definition (pure being), Marx searches for the simplest category with which he intends to begin his critique of political economy. Asking what is such a category to himself, he returns to political economy (5) (6).

§ 7 Confirmation of the First Category to Begin with

Returning to critique of political economy, Marx descends from land property via capital to division of labour, pointing firstly that capital conquers land property as ruling property, and secondly that the subjective essence of capital is alienated labour, and thirdly that the alienation of labour is caused by division of labour. Evidently, Marx is here conscious of A. Smith's theory of division of labour. Marx writes,

“As for *the essence of the division of labour* — and of course the division of labour had to be conceived as a major driving force in the production of wealth as soon as labour was recognized as *the essence of private property* — i.e., about *the estranged and alienated form of human activity as an activity of the species* — the political economists are very unclear and self-contradictory about it.” (p. 159)

A. Smith inquired the cause of wealth of nations which is opulently distributed even to the lowest class of civilized societies, and answered that *division of labour* is the very cause, which is, at the beginning, occasional occupation to be gradually fixed by propensity to exchange. Citing Smith's inquiry, Marx writes,

“The motive of those who engage in exchange is not *humanity* but *egoism*.” (162)

Smith does not think that humanity and egoism are inconsistent, but that *self-interest* is human nature as well as *sympathy* which has double sense : to sympathize other's self-interest and to get other's sympathy with one's own self-interest₍₁₃₎. Marx, however, like J.-J. Rousseau, defines the self-interest in Smith's sense as egoism which is inconsistent with natural self-love (*amour de soi*). Smith thinks that persons are individually conneted with each other through mutual sympathization with others' self-interest and thus they *unconsciously* bring about wealthy civilized society. Marx's study of Smith suggests that Marx investigates Smith's unconsciousness of the modern aliena-

tion in his theories of division of labour (chap. 1 of Bk. I), propensity to exchange (chap. 2), market (chap. 3) and money (chap. 4).

Modern private property has realized *social life* par excellence in alienated forms for the first time in history. Division of labour is the simplest form to begin with⁽¹⁴⁾ and capitalist accumulation is the developed. Marx's analyzing order in the *Third Manuscripts* from capitalist accumulation to division of labour *contrarily* reflects such Smith's demonstrating order in *The Wealth of Nations* as from the latter (Bk. I) to the former (Bk. II).

Now, Marx turns to the study of *money*, tracing Smith who treated money (chap. 4) after market (chap. 3). Marx writes,

"It [Money] converts my wishes from something in the realm of imagination, translates them from their meditated, imagined or willed existence into their *sensuous, actual* existence — from imagination to life, from imagined being into real being. In effecting this mediation, money is the *truly creative* power." (p. 168)

In the quotation above, we can read the essence of Marx's critical study of Hegel's *Logic*, which Marx defines as "the money of the spirit, the speculative or *thought-value* of man and of nature" (p. 174). Hegel perverts independent life-activities of nature and man into what are posited through the creative power of *Idea*. Like Hegel's *Idea*, money "as the existing and active concept of value" (p. 169) ideally rules material production and its results of immediate worker. Money thus appears as if it were "creative power", taking role of material production. Therefore, money is "*overturning* power" or "the *galvano-chemical* power of society" (p. 167) in the sense of Goethe's *Faust*. Marx will reconfirm the recognition of perversive character of Hegel's philosophy in the postscript to the second edition of *Capital*.

In this way, Marx has fulfilled critique of political economy and that of Hegel's philosophy in the *Paris Manuscripts* to expose the homologous relation between the two sciences.

Note

- (1) This is the English translation of my article in Japanese with the same title (Seishin no Kahei — Shoki Marx no Keizaigaku to Hegel tetsugaku tonō Sohdohkankei), in

the *Economic Bulletin of Senshu University, Tokyo*, vol. 19, no. 2, February, 1985. Partially altered and added.

- (2) Quotations from the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts (EPM)* are from *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, translated by Martin Milligan, edited with an introduction by Dirk J. Struik, International Publishers, New York, 1964, partially altered, shown only pages. Gregor Benton's translation of the *EPM*, in Karl Marx, *Early Writing*, Penguin Books, 1975, is referred and compared with M. Milligan's.
- (3) The order (1) — (10) is given by the new *MEGA's* first rendering (Erste Wiedergabe). cf. *MEGA*, 1-2, Dietz Verlag Berlin, 1982, S. 187-322. Pages shown as S. (Seite) are the *MEGA's*.
- (4) Cf. Takeyoshi Kawashima, *The Theory of Property Law (Shoyuhken-hoh no Riron)*, Iwanamishoten Publishers, Tokyo, 1949.
- (5) Cf. Hans-Jürgen Krahl, Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von Kapital und Hegelscher Wesenlogik, in *Aktualität und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels*, herausgegeben von Oskar Negt, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970 ; ders, *Konstitution und Klassenkampf*, Verlag Neue Kritik, 1971 ; Walter Neumann, *Der unbewusste Hegel*, Materialis Verlag, 1982.
- (6) In Marx's commentaries in the *Experts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy*, he has asserted that commodity exchange begins with *surplus-product* between communities and that as soon as the conversion of product into commodity spreads out into *necessary-product*, capitalist moments of production start to generate. cf. Rodney Livingstone's translation in the *Early Writings*, pp. 269-270.
- (7) Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A. V. Miller, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1977, p. 482.
- (8) Cf. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse — Foundations of the Political Economy (Rough Draft)*, translated with a Foreword by Martin Nicolaus, Penguin Books, 1973, p. 243, where he exposes that Smith's assumption of *propensity to exchange* is the subjectification of bourgeois axiom to behave as commodity-owner. cf. Hiroshi Uchida, *A Study of Marx's Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, Shinhyoron Publishers, Tokyo, 1982, pp. 120-123.
- (9) Vgl. K. Marx, *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, Neuveröffentlichung des Abschnittes 1 des Bandes 1 mit Text-kritischen Anmerkungen, hrsg. von Wataru Hiromatsu, Kawadeshobo-shinsha Verlag, Tokio, Japan, 1974, S. 90-112. Mr. Hiromatsu has completely

proved that the *German Ideology* edited by V.V. Adoratskiy "is defacto equal to a forgery", and proposed a plan of academic edition of the *German Ideology*. cf. W. Hiromatsu, Editorial Problems of the *German Ideology*, in *The Formation of Marxism (Marx-shugi no Seiritsukatei)*, Shiseido Publishers, Tokyo, 1984. The article had already been published in a Japanese Quarterly, *Materialism-study (Yuibutsuron-kenkyu)*, no.21, Spring, 1965. It gave Japanese Marxist academic world too severe a shock to respond immediately. Most of Japanese Marxist scholars now receive his opinions and quote the *German Ideology* from his edition.

Additionally speaking of the *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels founded their materialistic understanding of history in the sense that they described the course of primitive accumulation for the first time in the *German Ideology*, to basically establish their systematic critique of political economy. Other parts of the critique, they estimated, had already been developed in the *EPM*.

- (10) Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 488.
- (11) Marx succeeds the problematic of "selfish egoist" as personification of processing, self-increasing value from the *EPM* to *Grundrisse* in such a category as "selfish value [selbstischer Werth]". cf. K.Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 303, where Nicolaus translates the words "selbstischer Werth" into "egotistic value".
- (12) *Wealth of Nations*, vol. 2, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1976, p.687.
- (13) Cf. Yoshihiko Uchida, *The Process of Social Recognition (Shakaininshiki no Ayumi)*, Iwanamishoten Publishers, Tokyo, 1971, p. 160.
- (14) In the *EPM*, Marx defacto distinguishes two categories of division of labour; social and manufacture. In *Grundrisse*, he demonstrates how money generates from social division of labour, converting such Smith's writing order as from *simple circulation* (chap. 1, 2, 3) via *money* (chap. 4) to *commodity* (chap. 5), into the contrary order from *commodity* via *money* to *simple circulation*, though Marx temporarily has a plan to begin with *production in general*, being influenced by Smith's starting from division of labour. cf. H.Uchida, *A Study of Grundrisse*, pp. 87-89.

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